Although global mineral resources boast abundant total reserves and ample supply, under the unprecedented major shifts occurring over the past century—particularly amid the “regionalization” and “grouping” of global resource governance, as well as the emergence of anti-globalization mining policies adopted by certain countries aimed at boosting mining revenues—and compounded by the influence of financial capital, the global mineral resource market has experienced increasingly intense volatility. Consequently, more and more countries are placing greater emphasis on and paying closer attention to the issue of primary mineral raw material supply. As a major global consumer of mineral resources, China needs to place particular focus on its supply-security strategy for minerals that feature large import volumes, are critical to agricultural production, significantly impact infrastructure development and manufacturing in the national economy, and possess broad applicability.
　　I. Global mineral resources are abundant, and supply is generally ample.
　　(1) Globally, mineral resource reserves are generally “increasing as they are exploited.”
　　Over the past two decades of this century, despite the overall annual increase in consumption of major mineral commodities, continuous discoveries of new ore deposits worldwide—driven by innovative applications of exploration technologies and sustained increases in exploration investment and efforts—have not only ensured timely and effective replenishment of depleted mineral reserves but have also maintained an upward trend in total resource reserves. According to statistics from BP and the U.S. Geological Survey, compared to 2001, by the end of 2021, global reserves of minerals such as iron, manganese, chromium, copper, aluminum, lead, zinc, nickel, potash, and phosphorus had all increased to varying degrees. Among these, reserves of iron, aluminum, zinc, and potash rose by around 30%, while reserves of lead and nickel increased by approximately 40% to 60%. Reserves of manganese, copper, and phosphorus saw increases exceeding 100%.
　　(2) The global supply of major mineral products is relatively ample.
　　According to statistical data from institutions such as the U.S. Geological Survey and the World Steel Association, compared to 2001, the production of various mineral products—including coal, crude oil, natural gas, iron ore, manganese ore, chromite, copper concentrate, bauxite, lead concentrate, zinc concentrate, nickel concentrate, potash, and phosphate rock—exhibited a growth trend in 2021. (With the exception of a few minerals such as manganese, chromium, and nickel, China’s production growth rates for most minerals exceeded the global average; in particular, China’s potash production growth rate was as much as ten times higher than the global average.) Moreover, globally, mineral products as a whole have managed to maintain a balance between supply and demand. For instance, over the past decade, more than 70% of the years saw a slight surplus in supply. Among these, products such as steel, crude oil, and natural gas experienced supply surpluses ranging from 1% to 5%, while only a handful of products, including copper, showed a slight supply shortage. However, even the average supply deficit over the past decade remained below 1%, and this shortfall could be effectively addressed through inventory adjustments.
　　II. Mineral resources are receiving increasing attention from more and more countries.
　　After the end of the Cold War, the United States and many European countries began to sell off their mineral reserves built up during the Cold War era. At one point, it seemed that virtually all minerals could be readily procured on the market. However, this relatively stable period of relative calm lasted only a little over two decades. Today, some early industrialized nations—such as the United States, the European Union, and Japan—are once again emphasizing terms like “strategic minerals” and “critical minerals,” which originated during World War II. These terms have become increasingly prominent in strategic documents and plans drawn up by these countries, signaling that securing adequate supplies of mineral resources remains a major challenge that governments around the world must urgently address. In practice, over the past few years, countries including the United States, the European Union, Japan, Canada, Australia, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and India have all released updated lists of critical minerals and implemented strategic measures to ensure resource security. The cases of the United States, the European Union, and Japan are particularly illustrative: in order to build robust and responsible supply chains for critical minerals, these countries have continuously established multilateral or bilateral cooperation mechanisms with major resource-producing nations in the mineral resources sector, hoping that such collaboration will enhance the resilience of mineral resource value chains and supply chains. For example, the United States has spearheaded the establishment of multilateral cooperation initiatives such as the "Energy Resources Governance Initiative" and the "Mineral Security Partnership," thereby making the global geopolitical landscape of resources and the governance systems for resource management even more complex.
　　III. Priority should be given to ten types of minerals when ensuring the supply of mineral resources.
　　Referring to the updated lists of critical minerals published by countries such as the United States and the European Union, and taking into account the actual demand for mineral resources driven by the construction of China’s modern economic system, and based on data released by authoritative institutions, among the 28 minerals for which demand can be statistically analyzed or estimated, currently five minerals—coal, crude oil, natural gas, iron ore, and phosphate rock—have consumption levels exceeding 100 million tons. Another five minerals—copper, aluminum, manganese, chromium, and potash—exceed 10 million tons in consumption. Three minerals—fluorite, nickel, and crystalline graphite—exceed 1 million tons. The remaining 15 minerals—rare earth elements, tin, molybdenum, cobalt, tungsten, antimony, lithium, niobium, indium, gallium, gold, beryllium, germanium, tantalum, and rhenium—have consumption levels below 1 million tons. Among these, six minerals—indium, gallium, beryllium, germanium, tantalum, and rhenium—have consumption levels below 1,000 tons; notably, the consumption of beryllium and rhenium is less than 100 tons each.
　　In principle, all common minerals—such as those involved in agricultural production, energy security, and infrastructure development and manufacturing growth that are critical to the nation’s economic development—as well as minerals crucial for the energy transition under the “dual-carbon” goals, can be designated as key targets for ensuring supply stability. However, looking at the actual situation, over the past decade, the combined import value of eight mineral products—crude oil, natural gas, coal, iron ore, copper concentrate, bauxite, manganese ore, and chromite—has approached 90% of the total import value of all mineral products. On the other hand, these eight mineral products account for large import volumes, and the vast majority have an external dependence exceeding 50%. Moreover, these minerals happen to be the primary common resources that significantly impact energy security, infrastructure development, and manufacturing growth. Coupled with potash and phosphate rock—minerals essential for agricultural production—these 10 minerals have become the current priority targets for ensuring supply stability. Under the “dual-carbon” goals, although domestically produced minerals such as nickel, cobalt, and lithium—characterized by relatively small supply and demand volumes—are also in short supply, these minerals have achieved considerable success in “going global” in recent years, and they are unlikely to cause systemic impacts on economic and social development for the time being. Therefore, they can temporarily be excluded from the list of key supply-security priorities.
　　IV. There is no single “magic bullet” for ensuring the supply of the ten types of minerals; each case needs to be addressed differently.
　　For 10 types of minerals—including crude oil, natural gas, coal, iron ore, copper concentrate, bauxite, manganese ore, chromite, potash, and phosphate rock—the factors influencing the enhancement of supply capacity vary significantly. Among these, for three minerals—oil, natural gas, and copper—the primary constraint on improving development capacity is the insufficient discovery of domestic resources. For three others—iron ore, bauxite, and potash—the main limitation on output growth stems from the relatively poor quality of available resources. As for two minerals—coal and phosphate rock—the supply shortage or regional imbalances between supply and demand are largely attributable to policy-related issues. For two minerals—manganese ore and chromite—the supply shortage is primarily due to the scarcity of domestic resources. Additionally, inadequate resource exploration and development in high-altitude and ecologically fragile areas, as well as an underdeveloped recycling system for secondary resources such as scrap steel, scrap copper, and scrap aluminum, also hinder the full release of supply capacity.
　　(1) Exploration and supply assurance for three minerals—oil, natural gas, and copper—need to be strengthened.
　　Underpinned by innovation in deep-Earth exploration technologies and equipment, and safeguarded by innovative exploration mechanisms and enhanced vitality of the exploration market, we will increase fiscal investment in exploration, intensify efforts to discover new mineral deposits, consolidate and develop a new batch of mineral resource bases, and continuously strengthen our resource security foundation. Specifically, regarding oil and gas, we will accelerate efforts to boost reserves and production in western regions, advance the construction of offshore production bases, and step up development of unconventional oil and gas resources, striving to open up new frontiers for increased oil and gas production. As for copper mines, we must expedite solutions to the issue of insufficient supply from newly explored blocks, thereby creating fresh exploration space for breakthroughs in mineral discovery and reserve growth, and providing secure resource reserves to ensure stable and increased production of copper concentrates as well as support the core areas of mining and development bases.
　　(2) Two types of minerals—coal and phosphate ore—require coordinated policy measures to ensure stable supply.
　　In terms of coal, China boasts strong resource advantages and a solid production capacity base. The key to ensuring supply stability lies in the consistency and continuity of policies—there must be no more regionally or even globally blanket-style rectifications triggered by issues at individual mines. We cannot allow mining enterprises to keep oscillating between reactive rectifications and supply-ensuring policies, thereby undermining overall efforts to maintain and increase production. As for phosphate rock, although China as a whole currently enjoys a slight supply surplus, there is an imperfect spatial match between national phosphate fertilizer production and phosphate rock resource development. Moreover, the rapid growth in production of lithium iron phosphate batteries for new energy applications has squeezed the demand for phosphate rock used in fertilizer production; some major producing regions have imposed restrictions on cross-regional and cross-provincial shipments; and large enterprises are holding back their supplies out of caution. As a result, during the first half of 2022, China’s phosphate rock market experienced extreme supply tightness and soaring prices, prompting several listed companies engaged in phosphate fertilizer production to reduce their phosphate rock purchases and lower their operating rates in order to mitigate risks. In line with the requirement to build a unified national market, we need to abolish the restrictive policy that prohibits phosphate rock from leaving provinces or cities, thus promoting free market flows.
　　(3) For three types of minerals—iron ore, bauxite, and potash—innovation in technology needs to be strengthened to ensure supply.
　　China boasts abundant reserves of iron ore, bauxite, and potash salts; however, the quality of these resources is relatively poor, which adversely affects both the economic and ecological benefits of their exploitation and utilization. For instance, low-grade iron ore leads to the generation of large volumes of tailings during mining and processing. The red mud pollution associated with bauxite has yet to be fully addressed, and potash salts face environmental challenges due to the discharge of large quantities of bitter brine during brine-based potassium extraction. On the other hand, high-sulfur bauxite deposits beneath coal seams in China pose significant development difficulties owing to technological and process-related challenges. Currently, there are no successful, large-scale industrial cases of developing bauxite beneath coal seams within China. Similar technological shortcomings and weak links that constrain the enhancement of resource supply capabilities call for a sustained emphasis on innovation-driven development. By addressing the technical bottlenecks in resource exploration and development, we can expand the scope of resource security.
　　(4) Mineral resources such as iron, copper, and aluminum still require special policy support to ensure supply.
　　Recycling and reusing waste resources is an important measure for enhancing supply security. For example, in the United States, crude steel production in 2021 reached 87 million tons, of which 46 million tons were produced from scrap steel, satisfying approximately 53% of the demand for steelmaking raw materials. In China, as the accumulated stock of scrap metal resources continues to grow, the output of recycled metals has been steadily increasing overall. However, the contribution of recycled metals to the total raw material supply remains at only 20%–25%, still less than half the level seen in developed countries like the United States. The incomplete policy framework for recycling waste resources hinders the substitution of primary minerals by recycled metals. Therefore, the state needs to strengthen targeted policy support—such as tax incentives and fiscal measures—for the recycling of scrap steel, scrap copper, scrap aluminum, and other waste resources, thereby alleviating the pressure on the supply of primary minerals. For instance, regarding scrap copper, products that consumed copper around 2020 will enter their end-of-life phase around 2035, at which point they could generate about 4 million tons per year of alternative copper raw materials, potentially meeting roughly 30% of domestic copper demand. Moreover, the western regions of China are set to become the main areas driving future growth in mineral production; thus, these regions—with their high altitudes and fragile ecological environments—also require special policy support to ensure that their resources are fully exploited.
　　(5) Strengthen international mining cooperation to ensure supply.
　　In the oil and gas sector, in 2021, Russia’s crude oil and natural gas production accounted for 12.7% and 17.4% of the global total, respectively, and represented 15.5% and 9.9% of China’s total imports, respectively. It is advisable to strengthen bilateral exchanges and cooperation to ensure that Russia’s oil and gas imports continue to play a steadily rising role in China’s energy mix. In the non-oil and gas mineral sector, attention should be paid to resource-rich countries such as Brazil, Chile, Peru, Guinea, South Africa, Gabon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kazakhstan, and Indonesia. We should precisely align with these countries’ requirements for localization of their industrial chains, promote deep integration and mutual benefit within their value chains, and strive to reduce risks associated with overseas investments. At the same time, we must emphasize the promotion of sustainable and responsible mineral development, proactively release reliable and transparent data and information, minimize resistance from communities, the environment, labor, safety, and social governance, and effectively enhance enterprises’ ability to promptly convert their overseas rights and resources into actual production capacity, output, and supply assurance.
　　In addition, it is necessary to accurately analyze the international situation, dynamically assess supply and price risks, refine the policy toolkit, and strengthen our capacity to respond effectively to major international conflicts and resource-related emergencies. We must enhance our reserve-building capabilities by establishing a reserve system that integrates government and enterprise participation, linking reserves of products, production capacities, and production regions. We should also improve the national reserve systems and policies for products, production capacities, and production regions, thereby bolstering our ability to prevent and mitigate risks.