I. Counterfeiting Knows No Borders: Mining Fraud Sparks Global Sensation

Case A: Liaoning gold mine fraud nets 270 million yuan; numerous individuals jailed.

On December 1, 2015, the People's Court of Tiexi District in Shenyang City announced a bribery case. Two aging gold mines—whose combined gold content amounted to only about 400 kilograms—under the financial influence and manipulation of shareholder Li, successively obtained signatures from relevant personnel at the geological authorities. As a result, these mines were suddenly transformed into rich deposits containing over six tons of gold, sending many people to prison!

In 2009, China Gold Group Corporation planned to acquire the Jintai-Hongqi gold mine in Jianchang County, Liaoning Province. However, it needed a reserve report. Consequently, Li, a shareholder of the gold mine, immediately approached Zhang, the head of the First Exploration Division of the 11th Geological Brigade of Liaoning Province, asking him to find a solution.

Li wanted to transform the old gold mine—originally containing only 400 kilograms of gold—into a rich deposit with reserves exceeding 6 tons. Zhang said that preparing the report would require drilling, increasing the depth of exploration to better control the ore body and boost reserves, and suggested that he could enlist the help of his friend, who runs a drilling team.

Drilling operations began in November 2009 and concluded in February 2010. Once the documentation work got underway, Li gave Zhang a gold bar and 20,000 yuan in cash, and also provided another 20,000 yuan to a rehired engineer. After some maneuvering, the report indicating reserves of over 6 tons was finally produced.

The report has been prepared, and we still need to get the signature of Ding, who at the time served as the deputy chief engineer (acting as chief engineer) of the 11th Geological Brigade of Liaoning Province, followed by the signature of the brigade’s chief engineer, before we can affix the official seal.

Having accepted money from someone, one naturally has to help them avert misfortune. Zhang proactively approached Ding, hoping that Ding would lend a hand by signing the review report for the “Supplementary Geological Survey Report on the Jintai-Hongqi Gold Mine in Jianchang County, Liaoning Province,” and handed Ding 20,000 yuan in return.

The Jintai-Hongqi gold mine is an old mine that began operations back in the 1980s. Its actual reserves are now only about 400 kilograms. Suddenly, Zhang claimed he could help Li produce more than 6 tons. Ding, of course, understood perfectly: the extra reserves Li was planning to produce were intended to enable the gold mine to be sold at a higher price.

This report underwent three revisions, during which the estimated reserves were reduced from over 8 tons to just over 6 tons. Ding signed all three versions of the report. Of the money Ding received—10,000 yuan—Ding spent 10,000 yuan himself and deposited the other 10,000 yuan into a bank account.

After receiving this report, Li began arranging the sale of the mine. Li approached several senior executives from China Gold Group Corporation and others, lavishly bribing them with small sums of money to achieve significant results. Ultimately, he sold the gold mine to China Gold Group Corporation for over 270 million yuan.

In October 2013, the fraud involving the reserves of the Jintai-Hongqi gold mine in Jianchang County, Liaoning Province, was exposed. Relevant authorities subsequently stepped in and launched an investigation. Shareholder Li was arrested and taken into custody on suspicion of fraud. After his arrest, Li successively revealed the identities of individuals with whom he had engaged in monetary transactions.

Immediately afterward, the case triggered a series of high-level political upheavals. Several senior officials, including Wang Ronghu, General Manager of Liaoning Gold Company under China National Gold Corporation, were successively arrested on charges such as bribery. Ding and others from the 11th Geological Brigade of Liaoning Province were also arrested one after another.

Currently, two cases that have concluded through public trials reveal that after acquiring gold mines, China Gold Group Corporation appointed Gao as the general manager in charge of the gold mine acquisition and entrusted him with assisting in handling the relevant procedures. During this period, Gao accepted 30,000 yuan twice from Li. On May 15 of this year, Gao was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, with a five-year suspended sentence, for the crime of accepting bribes.

In the bribery case involving Ding, investigators also discovered that he had accepted 30,000 yuan from a certain mine in Heilongjiang Province by taking advantage of his official position. Recently, the People's Court of Tiexi District ruled that Ding was guilty of accepting bribes and abusing his authority as an employee of a public institution. Considering multiple offenses concurrently, the court sentenced him to four years of imprisonment.

Case B: The fraudulent mining rights of the “Busang Gold Mine” have left investors bankrupt and wiped out their entire investments.

Twenty years ago, the “Busang Gold Mine” mining rights fraud scandal sent shockwaves around the globe, driving numerous mineral resource investors into bankruptcy. In May 1993, Bre-X, a Canadian junior exploration company, acquired the mining rights to the “Busang Gold Mine” from Belaid Company in Indonesia’s Kalimantan Province. Soon after, the company began releasing one “good news” after another about the mine’s exploration progress: In October 1995, it announced discovered reserves of 5 million ounces (about 160 tons); by the end of 1996, the reported reserves had surged to 71 million ounces (about 2,270 tons). The “Busang Gold Mine” became the world’s largest gold deposit in terms of proven reserves at the time, with an estimated annual gold production capacity of 84 tons once it went into operation. Meanwhile, Bre-X’s stock price skyrocketed rapidly—from just 0.5 Canadian dollars per share before the first announcement of discovered reserves in October 1995 to an astonishing 250 Canadian dollars per share by August 1996—a rise of roughly 500 times in only ten months!

After Freeport-McMoRan, a major mining company, acquired the mining rights to the "Busang Gold Mine," it first verified the data provided by Bre-X. To do so, it randomly selected four drill holes for verification and conducted duplicate drilling at locations 1.5 meters away from the original borehole positions. Under strict confidentiality measures, samples were simultaneously sent to three reputable commercial laboratories for analysis. Before the market opened on March 27, 1997, Freeport-McMoRan announced the verification results: the average grade of the original ore body was just 0.06 grams per ton! As soon as trading began, Bre-X’s stock price plummeted by 83%. A wave of panic selling triggered a market halt. The mineral exploration market suddenly plunged into a deep winter.

Later, Bre-X’s stock price remained stable at around 2 to 3 Canadian dollars per share for 40 days. Some naïve mineral exploration investors believed that even if the company didn’t have a gold resource of 71 million ounces, having just one-tenth of that amount would still be worth something. However, on May 7, news broke that all the exploration data for the “Busang Gold Mine” were fabricated—that the “Busang Gold Mine” simply did not exist. As a result, Bre-X’s stock price plummeted from 3.12 Canadian dollars per share to just 0.03 Canadian dollars per share. This junior exploration company, whose market capitalization had once reached 6.8 billion Canadian dollars (about 47 billion RMB), suddenly vanished into thin air. In this century’s largest exploration scam, countless exploration investors lost their entire fortunes and ended up with nothing but empty pockets.

Case C: The mining rights transfer contract is an administrative contract, and if the reserve figures are inaccurate, the administrative authority shall bear responsibility.

In October 2003, the mining rights for a sand and gravel mine located at Shangqilihe Horticultural Farm in Shucheng County, Anhui Province, were publicly put up for auction. The auction announcement indicated that the mine’s recoverable reserves amounted to 1.3 million tons. On November 11 of the same year, Luotong Building Materials Co., Ltd. of Shucheng County, Anhui Province (hereinafter referred to as Luotong Company) won the mining rights for this sand and gravel mine by submitting a bid of 13.5 million yuan. Subsequently, Luotong Company sent a letter to the Shucheng County Government addressing four issues raised in the auction announcement—taxes, reserves, and others. On November 18, the Shucheng County Government issued Document No. Shuzheng Mi (2003) 111, explicitly guaranteeing Luotong Company an extraction volume of 1.3 million tons of yellow sand.

On November 20, the Shucheng County Bureau of Land and Resources (Party A) and Lutong Company (Party B) signed a Mining Rights Transfer Contract. On December 2 of the same year, Lutong Company obtained Mining Permit No. 342450310021.

Shortly after Lu Tong Company began operations, it discovered that the thickness of the arable layer at the sand and gravel mine site was significantly greater than the 0.5-meter figure specified in the contract, and the recoverable sand reserves were also less than 90% of those indicated in the mining rights transfer contract. On June 5, 2006, Lu Tong Company determined that the sand resources at the Shangqilihe Garden Sand Mine had been exhausted and ceased mining operations. A certificate issued by the Sand and Gravel Company showed that Lu Tong Company had extracted a total of 547,210 tons of yellow sand.

Lutong Company believes that the amount of mineral resources transferred in this transaction significantly differs from the actual reserves, and that the thickness of the soil layer, as well as the content of moisture, clay, and gravel, all exceed the quantities stipulated in the contract. The actions of the Shucheng County Government and the Shucheng County Bureau of Land and Resources constitute a serious breach of contract and have already caused substantial losses to Lutong Company. Therefore, Lutong Company has filed a lawsuit against the Shucheng County Government and the Shucheng County Bureau of Land and Resources, with a certain geological team from Anhui Province as a third party (in June 2003, Shucheng Mining Co., Ltd. commissioned this geological team to conduct a geological survey of the sand and gravel mineral resources at the Shangqilihe Horticultural Farm in Shucheng County, requesting a preliminary assessment of the quality and recoverable reserves of the sand and gravel deposits. According to the geological team’s survey results, the estimated reserves of sand and gravel amounted to 1.5645 million tons; however, due to the proximity of residential areas in the surrounding region, the actual extractable reserves are likely to be less than the reported figure). Meanwhile, the Shucheng County Government argues that it is not a proper defendant in this case, while the Shucheng County Bureau of Land and Resources contends that the geological team should bear responsibility.

Court Ruling:

First-instance judgment:

1. Terminate the mining rights transfer contract signed between Lutong Company and the Shucheng County Bureau of Natural Resources and Land.

2. The Shucheng County Government and the Shucheng County Bureau of Land and Resources shall compensate Lutong Company for its direct losses in the amount of 5.5989 million yuan.

3. A certain geological team does not assume civil liability;

4. Dismiss the other claims brought by Lutong Company.

Lutong Company, the Shucheng County Government, and the Shucheng County Bureau of Land and Resources all appealed against the above-mentioned civil judgment rendered by the court of first instance.

Second-instance judgment: The second item of the civil judgment No. 29 of the First Instance (2007) issued by the Intermediate People's Court of Lu'an City, Anhui Province, was revoked; items one, three, and four, as well as the portion concerning the allocation of litigation costs, were upheld. Furthermore, in accordance with the law, the People's Government of Shucheng County and the Shucheng County Bureau of Land and Resources were ordered to compensate Anhui Shucheng Lutong Building Materials Co., Ltd. for direct economic losses exceeding 88.4 million yuan.

II. The All-too-Common Phenomenon of Falsification in Geological and Mining Fields

The main types of falsification in the geology and mining industry are as follows:

1. Fake Project: A project that’s been mislabeled—changing the name, shifting the coordinates, and simply cutting and pasting text from a computer—yet another “project” all the same.

2. False anomaly: Verify the dispersed-flow anomaly by randomly selecting one of the trenches for re-sampling. For sampling points where no paint markings can be found on the map, search systematically and thoroughly. Suddenly, the accompanying person shouted from behind the jungle, “I’ve found it—right here!” Upon closer inspection, the red paint was bright, moist, and freshly applied.

3. Fake Trench Exploration: We were about to inspect a promising trench exploration site when our companion, out of kindness, advised, “The mountain is too high and the path too dangerous—there’s no need for you, sir, to go up there yourself.” But despite his warnings, I insisted on climbing up. After using the GPS to pinpoint our location, I looked around—and what greeted me was nothing but a lush, untouched expanse of green grassland, never disturbed by human hands.

4. Fake Drill Holes: The mineralized zone stretches for over ten kilometers, and three drill holes have been drilled—all showing promising grades and thicknesses. The exploration potential of this mineralized zone offers plenty of room for imagination—what a great project! The review expert who approved my proposal lavished praise on it and signed off without hesitation. Later, someone came forward to accuse me, claiming that the mine area had already seen 20 drill holes, yet the “white-eye” holes and mineralized holes had been erased from the maps. There’s even a technique called “erasing drill holes,” and another one called “drawing drill holes.”

5. Fake Samples: A drilling rig continuously drills at the same location in a small, privately-owned mine that boasts both good grade and thickness, collecting core samples. After paying the mine owner a substantial sum of money, the rig operator takes the core samples away and sells them to prospectors holding exploration rights for the same mineralization zone and the same type of ore deposit—who are themselves conducting active exploration. Right next to their own roaring drilling rigs, these prospectors generously invite the buyers of exploration rights to take some core samples themselves and then send them off for analysis.

6. The Fake Grade: At a placer gold exploration site, samples collected by the sand-dragging machine were placed in a sample bucket. Suddenly, a mysterious figure with a low-brimmed straw hat appeared. With just two fingers, he gently pinched something from the bucket and added a bit of “concentrate,” then quietly slipped away. Only then did the panning workers begin their panning process.

7. Fake Ore Body: In a certain province in southern China, the mineral rights holder claims to own a large gold deposit. At first glance on the map, it appears to be a quartz-vein-type gold deposit—a mineral vein several kilometers long, with every trench exploration revealing mineralization of remarkably consistent grade and thickness. Due to a lack of geological expertise, the level of fraud involved in creating this “mineral body” on the map is still at an elementary stage, and the artificially constructed massive ore body has already begun to reveal its true nature.

8. False thickness: This is easy to fix—just modify the original catalog, and you can do it all with a few clicks of the mouse on your computer. False length: A mineral body that shouldn’t have been connected at all—it’s simply “connected” with a broad stroke of the pen, and thus a long, continuous mineral body is born.

9. Fake Map: As soon as the map was laid out, another newly discovered ore deposit appeared. Overwhelmed with excitement, I suddenly realized that this map looked incredibly familiar—almost as if I’d seen it somewhere before. But why on earth had this mine been moved from Location A to Location B? The Zhangjiachuang mining area had become the Lijiachuang mining area.

10. Fake Reserves: Driven by extraordinarily high profits, Bre-X inflated a virtually non-existent virtual ore deposit to an estimated gold resource of several thousand tons. Southwest Gold Company “calculated” 150 tons of gold from a mine containing only 20 tons.

11. Fake Reports: Given the series of previous falsifications, can geological reports describing the value of exploration rights still be genuine?

……

During the “golden decade” of mining from 2003 to 2012, the number of geological surveyors and mining personnel surged dramatically, leading to a sharp expansion in the capacity of the geology and mining industry. At the same time, the quality of practitioners declined, regulatory oversight proved inadequate, and driven by the lure of hefty profits, fraudulent practices became increasingly common!

Previously, MiningWorld (ID: MiningWorld) recommended an article titled “What on Earth Is the Current Geological Team Like?!”. A grassroots geologist revealed the widespread phenomena of project fraud and distortion within geological teams. Sadly, these phenomena have already become the norm!

3. Why do they dare to be so brazen?

1. Most of the exploration areas are located deep in rugged, mountainous regions with extremely harsh conditions. Unfortunately, some unscrupulous individuals take advantage of the mountains’ concealment and the remote, sparsely populated nature of these exploration areas—exploiting regulatory loopholes—to deliberately falsify geological data or fabrication drilling records, thereby deceiving clients through cunning and underhanded tactics.

2. Investing in mineral exploration carries significant risks, yet the potential returns can be extremely lucrative. For the sake of exorbitant profits, unscrupulous individuals will even dare to flout the law and risk being sentenced to death—simply by falsifying, exaggerating, or fabricating exploration data to create a fictitious mine.

3. Using falsified survey data usually doesn't immediately expose the deception. It's like an unexploded bomb—only when the shaft is dug down and the tunnels are in place will it “explode.” And by then, many years have passed, and both the place and the people involved have long since changed beyond recognition.

IV. Problems in China’s Management System

Is there really no one to crack down on these fraudulent practices? Can these lawbreakers who engage in fraud just get away with it scot-free?

Although China has established an exploration and development management system that is similar to those of internationally advanced mining countries—such as systematic exploration standards, exploration qualification requirements, and a certification system for mineral reserve appraisers—it still faces certain challenges.

However, compared with developed mining countries, China’s management system has many problems:

1. In China, there is a strong emphasis on maintaining the confidentiality of primary data. As a result of this rule, once falsification occurs, the scope of its impact is limited solely to the falsifier (the owner or the qualified professional) and the government regulatory authorities. The punitive consequences imposed on the falsifier are relatively mild, insufficient to deter them from continuing their fraudulent practices or to prevent others from engaging in similar misconduct.

Under market conditions, there is a distinction between trade secrets and the confidentiality of information: property owners will always go to great lengths to ensure that more people become aware of their exploration results, in order to secure financing as quickly as possible, rather than keeping the information confidential. For publicly listed companies, disclosing information is mandatory. As a result of this disclosure requirement, once information is falsified, everyone will find out. Before committing fraud, those who falsify information will invariably weigh the potential consequences carefully.

2. China’s system of exploration qualifications and mineral reserve appraiser qualifications is equivalent to the qualification system for professionals in mining-developed countries. In China, exploration qualifications are assigned on a unit-based responsibility system, while mineral reserve evaluations are jointly overseen by both reserve appraisers and reserve evaluation institutions—thus, China has effectively divided up the responsibilities that would otherwise be handled by a single professional in mining-developed countries.

During the exploration process, drilling operations are carried out by a qualified drilling team, testing is conducted by a qualified laboratory, and ore-processing tests are also handled by a qualified laboratory. The geological team is solely responsible for compiling records and submitting technical reports. In the review and verification of resource reserves, the geological team with exploration qualifications must guarantee the authenticity of the data; in other words, the reserve appraiser bears no joint liability for any issues arising from the authenticity of the data.

In developed mining countries, the qualified person must take full responsibility for drilling, sampling, sample preparation, testing, resource estimation, and reserve conversion—rather than simply dividing up responsibilities. For example, while testing is typically carried out by a qualified laboratory, if any issues arise during testing, the qualified person—not the laboratory—remains ultimately accountable. With clearly defined responsibilities, when problems are identified, accountability can be directly traced back to the specific individual involved.

3. China’s exploration standards are detailed and well-defined, but their implementation largely depends on the geological teams’ own management practices, lacking oversight from third parties. Meanwhile, the acquisition of primary data and the estimation of resource quantities are predominantly handled by the geological teams themselves.

In developed mining countries, the independence of third-party qualified professionals is strongly emphasized. The first qualified professional is responsible for the authenticity and integrity of the original database. This first qualified professional may be an employee of the project owner’s own company, an independent third party, or an independent third party involved in the exploration process who assumes “supervisory” responsibilities. If the first qualified professional is from the project owner’s own company, a second, independent third-party qualified professional must be engaged to review the original database completed by the first qualified professional and to take responsibility for resource estimation and subsequent reserve conversion. Should the first qualified professional be found guilty of serious falsification yet still receive approval from the second qualified professional, the second qualified professional will also bear joint liability for the falsification.

4. The division of responsibilities regarding data between mining rights holders and geological survey teams in China is unclear, and in practice, a relationship akin to that between “employer” and “employee” actually exists. If the “employer” falsifies information, the “employee,” in order to “survive,” might comply without question. Conversely, if the “employee” commits fraud, the “employer” would welcome it wholeheartedly—after all, technical matters are your responsibility as the “employee.”

In developed mining countries, qualified professionals are relatively independent in their professional activities, and they serve as mutual checks and balances against the mineral rights holders when issues of fraud might arise. If the rights holder commits fraud but the qualified professional approves it, the qualified professional will bear joint and several liability. Conversely, if the qualified professional commits fraud, the primary legal responsibility clearly rests with the rights holder. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the rights holder to select qualified professionals who possess the necessary business competence.

V. It is imperative to improve China’s relevant systems.

Therefore, it is imperative to promptly refine China’s relevant systems, including the qualification system for qualified personnel with sovereign attributes, so that developed countries will recognize China’s qualification system rather than merely accepting Australia’s recognition of qualified personnel. Simply obtaining Australian recognition would not address the issue at its root.

First, establish regulations based on technical standards and specifications. Following the Bre-X “gold exploration scam of the century,” Canada enacted the NI43-101 national standard in 2001, which sets forth requirements for personnel qualifications, rights and obligations, methods of information disclosure, and the format and content of geological reports—elevating these to the level of law. Any entity or individual carrying out activities in violation of the NI43-101 national standard will be deemed in violation of the law. Our country should follow suit and establish a strong legal deterrent against those who falsify exploration data. Tian Wenhua, chairman of the Sanlu Group, serves as a cautionary example.

Second, we should establish a system of independent exploration geologists. Independent exploration geologists—also known as registered geologists—are field mineral exploration geologists who possess the requisite knowledge, experience, and physical fitness, and they hold an independent professional qualification. One of their key responsibilities is to verify the authenticity and representativeness of exploration geological data and to bear lifelong legal responsibility for their accuracy. The current system of expert panel reviews, with its unclear allocation of duties, rights, and responsibilities, no longer adequately meets the practical needs of commercial mineral exploration under market economy conditions.

Third, establish an industry self-regulatory system and a blacklist mechanism. Specifically, leverage the self-regulatory role of industry associations: once a fraudster is placed on the blacklist, they will be barred from engaging in geological exploration activities. During the transitional period, if any fraudulent behavior is detected, the exploration qualifications of the offending entity will be immediately revoked. We must ensure that fraudsters do not gain any undue advantage; only by making them pay a heavy price can we stem the current tide of exploration fraud and defuse the ticking time bomb.

Attachment:

China’s Laws and Regulations on Geological Data and Mineral Resources (Partial)

Regulations on the Management of Mineral Resources in Shaanxi Province
Regulations on the Management of Mineral Resources in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region
Regulations on the Administration of Mineral Resources in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (Amended)
Regulations on the Management of Mineral Resources in Qinghai Province
Regulations on the Management of Mineral Resources in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region
Regulations on the Management of Mineral Resources in Yunnan Province
Regulations of Yunnan Province on Foreign-Invested Exploration and Mining of Mineral Resources
Regulations on the Administration of Geological Exploration Qualifications
Interim Measures for the Supervision and Administration of Mineral Resources
Regulations on Safety Supervision of Coal Mines
Regulations on the Collection and Administration of Mineral Resource Compensation Fees
Special Provisions of the State Council on Preventing Safety Accidents in Coal Mine Production
Interim Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Resource Tax (Amended)
Regulations on the Management of Geological Data
Regulations on the Administration of Township and Village Coal Mines
Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Foreign Exploitation of Offshore Oil Resources (Amended)
Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Foreign Cooperation in the Exploitation of Onshore Petroleum Resources (Amended)
Administrative Measures for Coal Production Licenses
Administrative Measures for the Transfer of Prospecting Rights and Mining Rights
Administrative Measures for the Registration of Mineral Resource Exploitation
Administrative Measures for the Registration of Mineral Resource Exploration Blocks
The Mineral Resources Law of the People's Republic of China
Implementation Rules of the Mineral Resources Law of the People's Republic of China
Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Resource Tax
Implementation Rules for the Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Resource Tax
Regulations on the Collection and Administration of Mineral Resource Compensation Fees
Regulations on the Collection, Management, and Accounting of Mineral Resource Compensation Fees
Regulations on Environmental Protection for Offshore Oil Exploration and Development of the People's Republic of China
Implementation Measures for the Regulations on Environmental Protection Management of Offshore Oil Exploration and Development in the People's Republic of China
Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Foreign Cooperation in the Exploitation of Marine Petroleum Resources
Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Foreign Cooperation in the Exploitation of Onshore Petroleum Resources
Administrative Measures for Coal Production Licenses
Implementation Rules for the Administration of Coal Production Licenses
Regulations on the Administration of Township and Village Coal Mines
Implementation Measures for the Regulations on the Administration of Township and Village Coal Mines
Notice of the State Council on Rectifying Mining Order and Safeguarding the State’s Ownership of Mineral Resources
The State Council’s Reply on the Use of Overseas Funds for the Exploitation of Low-Grade and Difficult-to-Process Metallic Mineral Resources
Notice of the State Council on Rectifying and Regulating Individual Coal Mining Operations
Request for Interpretation of Article 5 of the
Request for Legislative Interpretation of Article 41 of the
Request for Further Interpretation of Article 44 of the Implementation Rules of the Mineral Resources Law
Administrative Penalty Measures for Violations of Mineral Resources Regulations
Interim Measures for the Management of the Geological Exploration Market
Administrative Measures for the Qualification of Geological Exploration Units
Provisional Measures for the Paid Use Management of Mineral Resource Exploration Results
Administrative Measures for the Registration of Mineral Resource Exploration Results
Methods for Dividing and Numbering Mineral Resource Exploration Blocks
Interim Measures for the Registration and Statistical Management of Mineral Reserves
Implementation Rules for the National Management Measures for the Submission of Geological Data
Notice on Implementing the Relevant Provisions of the Implementation Regulations of the Water and Soil Conservation Law
Notice on Strengthening the Management of Gold Production
Notice on Issues Related to Geological Exploration for Gold Mines
Regulations on the Application and Approval Procedures for Establishing Gold Mining Enterprises
 

Some materials are sourced from China Mining Network and Chen Yuan’s Sina Blog.