浙江之源资产评估有限责任公司
New Trends in International Mining Development and Their Implications for Ensuring China’s Resource Supply
Release time:
2025-11-06
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China's Land and Resources Economics
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With Trump returning to power, his “America First” approach will further exacerbate global economic turmoil and significantly disrupt global commodity markets, ultimately severely impacting the stable supply and demand of China’s strategic mineral resources. At the same time, the international mining market is witnessing a flurry of “super” mergers and acquisitions, as the control and influence wielded by major international mining giants continue to consolidate and strengthen. Moreover, the U.S. government’s expressed intention to purchase Greenland underscores the increasingly prominent role of national will in resource security amid intensifying great-power competition. Faced with this new situation, if China is to achieve high-quality development and advance Chinese-style modernization, it must remain committed to reform and opening-up, unswervingly promote high-quality joint construction of the Belt and Road Initiative, and uphold the principles of win-win cooperation, mutual benefit, and common development. We must formulate long-term plans for the development of China’s mining sector and implement comprehensive, long-term safeguarding strategies for critical mineral resources. We should fully advance China’s distinctive diplomacy as a major country, enhance our national image, and ensure the secure repatriation of the nation’s vital strategic resources. Furthermore, we need to adopt differentiated measures tailored to specific key minerals, develop targeted development strategies and policies, continuously nurture China’s core enterprises in the mineral resources sector, strive to increase industry concentration and market competitiveness, and comprehensively enhance both our capacity to secure strategic mineral resources and our ability to exercise effective resource control.
Information cited in this article
Zuo Geng and Li Xiaojie. New Trends in International Mining Development and Their Implications for Ensuring China’s Resource Supply [J]. China Land & Resources Economy, 2025, 38(10):4-11.
Table of Contents
CONTENTS
1. Trump’s return to power will pose significant challenges to China’s new energy industry and the global metals mining sector.
2. Global metal mining development is now characterized by a new trend: frequent mega-mergers and acquisitions, escalating geopolitical competition, and intensifying competition for critical minerals driven by technological advancements.
3 New Trends in the International Mining Landscape and Their Implications for the Development of China’s Strategic Mineral Resources Industry
4. Relevant recommendations for ensuring the supply of China’s strategic mineral resources
Since 2023, the international political and economic environment has seen an increase in adverse factors, making China’s economic and social development face a complex and intricate situation. The Ukraine crisis has persisted beyond expectations; sudden, extreme turmoil has erupted in the Middle East; under the Federal Reserve’s series of “frenzied” interest-rate hikes, U.S. society and economy are grappling with mounting contradictions; Europe and Japan are experiencing weak economic recoveries; global capital flows have been highly volatile; and the global economy continues to grow at a sluggish pace. In January 2025, Trump will return to power, emphasizing the “America First” policy and highlighting “U.S. interests.” Against the backdrop of great-power competition, prices of key commodities and gold have repeatedly hit new highs, leaving the overall market environment “mysterious and confusing.” At present, China is at a critical stage of accelerating its transformation and upgrading, striving vigorously to achieve high-quality development. It is also at a pivotal moment for comprehensively advancing the cause of building a strong nation and realizing national rejuvenation through Chinese-style modernization. Faced with new changes in both the domestic and international development environments, we must carefully plan, adopt long-term strategies, proceed step by step, and steadily pursue our goals.
On January 20, 2025, Trump was sworn in as the new U.S. president and immediately announced the withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement and the World Health Organization. From the perspective of the global development landscape, the Trump administration has placed greater emphasis on “defensive” measures aimed at safeguarding U.S. domestic interests, stressing that “America is for Americans.” During his previous term, he had already carried out large-scale withdrawals of U.S. troops stationed overseas. Based on this logic, it is highly likely that the Trump administration will alter the trajectory of the Ukraine crisis and geopolitical conflicts in the Middle East, shifting its support for Ukraine and Israel from overt to covert. Particularly in the case of Ukraine, NATO countries—other than the United States—will become the main force directly confronting Russia head-on. In doing so, the United States may further weaken the economic influence of the European Union. As for the Middle East, the Trump administration is happy to see turmoil among oil-producing nations, enabling it to significantly boost U.S. energy exports, disrupt the global energy supply structure, and enhance the global competitive edge of its traditional manufacturing sector. High oil prices represent an important tool for the United States to siphon off economic benefits from countries around the world and to undermine the energy security necessary for China’s transition toward high-quality economic development.
1.1 The Trump administration’s policy platform could push China’s new energy industry into a predicament. A dilemma situation
The Trump administration has set forth the goal of revitalizing traditional industries, supporting the production and development of conventional energy sources, and cutting green subsidies—fundamentally aiming to encourage manufacturing industries that have lost their supply chains to “return home,” thereby filling the gaps in America’s industrial manufacturing value chain and enabling it to engage in comprehensive and robust competition with China. Among these, the U.S. oil, natural gas, and shale gas sectors are likely to be the biggest beneficiaries, while the globally burgeoning green energy sector could face a severe blow. From the very beginning of his term, Trump once again announced the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement—meaning that the U.S. will no longer be bound by the United Nations’ carbon emission constraints. This move not only boosts the development of America’s energy industry but also places China’s economy, which is undergoing a transformation, in a difficult position—caught between two fires, squeezed from both sides. On one side is the European Union’s aggressively promoted and nearly fully implemented carbon tariffs; on the other side is the U.S.’s strong support for traditional energy sources. Meanwhile, China has already made new energy a key driver for its high-quality economic transformation, yet the trend toward a fossil-fuel-dominated energy mix in China’s future remains unchanged for the foreseeable long term. As a result, China’s economy will face a prolonged challenge: how to vigorously develop clean energy while maintaining a relatively high share of traditional energy sources, thus achieving genuine energy conservation and emissions reduction. If these issues are mishandled, both China’s traditional energy and new energy sectors could face complete stagnation or even forced restructuring and realignment—a scenario whose consequences would be unimaginable.
1.2 United States The “reshoring of manufacturing” strategy could bring about a major shift in the global bulk metal commodity landscape.
During his previous term, Trump placed particular emphasis on the strategy of “bringing manufacturing back home.” As the world’s largest economy, the United States has already completed its industrialization process. While the “manufacturing return” may not directly have a significant impact on sectors such as basic nonferrous metals and the steel industry, the strong-dollar policy introduced by the Trump administration will erode the purchasing power of the Chinese yuan, thereby driving up the costs for Chinese enterprises to import mineral products and metal finished goods. This, in turn, will further squeeze profit margins in China’s metal smelting and rolling industries, forcing some enterprises to cut production or even halt operations altogether. As for other small-metal commodity sectors, the U.S. “manufacturing return” signifies that the U.S. is poised to build a fully integrated industrial chain for small metals—especially those listed by the U.S. government as critical minerals. It should be noted that the U.S.’s emphasis on “bringing manufacturing back home” represents a major initiative aimed at strengthening the domestic supply chains for critical minerals within the U.S., with the ultimate goal of reducing America’s reliance on imports of related products from China. This move by the U.S. will inevitably lead to shifts or realignments among stakeholders and alliance members, putting pressure on—or even causing shortages or disruptions in—the supply of raw materials to China’s relevant industries. This trend is particularly evident in certain pro-U.S. countries in Oceania, South America, Africa, and Asia, fundamentally altering the global supply-and-demand dynamics of bulk metal commodities that have long been supported by “Chinese demand,” and making the trend toward fragmentation and decoupling increasingly pronounced.
1.3 With The fragmentation of the metal mining industry, exemplified by “three rare metals” Serious development trend Jùn
As the competition among major powers and the scramble for critical minerals intensify, the fragmentation of the “three rare metals” mining sector will become even more pronounced. Due to natural endowment factors, the global distribution of “three rare metals” mineral resources is highly uneven. For example, over 70% of the world’s cobalt is concentrated in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Africa; nearly 90% of the world’s niobium is found in Brazil; almost 60% of the world’s chromium is located in South Africa and Kazakhstan; and close to three-quarters of the world’s manganese (in terms of potential reserves) are concentrated in countries such as South Africa. Since Trump took office, driven by policies aimed at “bringing manufacturing back home” and easing restrictions on artificial intelligence (AI), the precision manufacturing, high-end manufacturing, and high-tech industries are bound to receive increased support—potentially intensifying competition for the “three rare metals,” which are crucial to the development of these sectors. At the same time, this will also subject China’s existing resource-security framework to unprecedented challenges. For instance, China’s advantageous metal industries, such as tungsten and rare earths, may in the future face full-scale competition from a revamped U.S. industrial chain. The competitive advantages China has built along the industrial value chain—such as in metal separation and processing—could be undermined or even replaced altogether. Therefore, the ultimate consequence of the U.S. “bring manufacturing back home” policy and the relaxation of AI restrictions, leading to heightened competition for related resources, will be a fundamental disruption of the global metal-mining industry’s entire industrial-chain structure, with a clear trend toward fragmentation and sectoral isolation.
2 Global metal mining development is now characterized by a new trend: frequent mega-mergers and acquisitions, escalating geopolitical competition, and intensifying competition for critical minerals driven by technological innovation.
2.1 Super Mergers and Acquisitions in the International Metals and Mining Market Are Becoming Frequent.
Since December 2023, the international metals and mining market has seen a flurry of mega-mergers and acquisitions, each sending shockwaves through the market and, in the short term, even triggering volatility in the commodity markets.
On December 18, 2023, Nippon Steel Corporation officially announced its plan to acquire all shares of U.S. Steel—a company with a 122-year history—through a cash offer at a premium of 2 trillion yen (approximately US$15 billion). The company stated that, if the deal goes through smoothly, it will become the largest cross-border merger and acquisition in Nippon Steel’s history. Following the announcement, the proposed acquisition has faced unanimous opposition from the United Steelworkers union as well as both houses of the U.S. Congress. As things stand now, although the likelihood of Nippon Steel successfully completing the acquisition is extremely low, there still remains a glimmer of hope—if Nippon Steel’s future offer can effectively strike a chord with Trump’s “business instincts.” In February 2025, Trump made a statement regarding Nippon Steel’s acquisition bid, saying it was “not necessarily impossible.” Should the acquisition indeed succeed, Nippon Steel’s global crude steel production capacity would surpass that of China’s Ansteel, making it the world’s third-largest crude steel producer after China Baowu and ArcelorMittal. At the same time, Nippon Steel would also secure a significant share of the U.S. steel market and maintain its relative competitive edge over China in terms of raw materials, technology, and other aspects related to steel exports. Under these circumstances, China’s steel exports would face even greater challenges. Once exports are hindered, the domestic steel market’s supply-demand balance would inevitably suffer a severe blow, further worsening an already oversupplied steel market.
On April 24, 2024, BHP proposed to acquire Anglo American for £31 billion (approximately US$39.1 billion), but the offer was rejected. On May 13, BHP made a second bid, raising the acquisition price to £34 billion (approximately US$42.7 billion), only to face another rejection. On May 22, BHP once again increased its offer to £38.6 billion (approximately US$49.2 billion), yet again encountering rejection. Given the enormous scale of funds involved in this transaction, it has been widely dubbed by the media as the "deal of the century" in the global mining industry. As things stand now, despite being turned down three times in a row, BHP has still not given up on its acquisition intentions and continues to try to persuade Anglo American to accept its offer or grant it another opportunity to make a new bid. Meanwhile, Anglo American has been actively divesting its assets with relatively low profitability, seeking to optimize its financial position and thereby gain greater bargaining power and better returns in any future potential acquisitions. According to incomplete information, if BHP’s future offer exceeds US$52 billion, the deal could finally be reached. If that happens, BHP will further consolidate its position as the global mining industry leader—especially in copper resources. BHP would become a giant among global copper producers, significantly boosting its market influence and clout, and its ability to control the market would become virtually unshakable.
Recently, market sources reported that Rio Tinto—the world’s second-largest mining company—intends to spend up to 50 billion U.S. dollars to acquire another mining giant, Glencore. Although the two companies are currently only at the stage of preliminary discussions, should their merger go through successfully, Rio Tinto’s scale in the “Global Ranking of Listed Mining Companies” would come remarkably close to that of BHP Billiton, the current leader—and there’s even a possibility that Rio Tinto could leapfrog to become the world’s top-ranked mining company. Moreover, for Rio Tinto, which has long dominated international mineral prices, and for Glencore, which has been a powerful force in the global metals futures markets since its inception and enjoys an outstanding reputation worldwide, the merger would grant them even greater—and potentially monopolistic—leverage in both the spot and futures markets for bulk metals. As a result, as soon as news of this potential merger broke, it sent ripples of excitement—and concern—throughout the global mineral markets. Once the merger is completed, pricing and negotiation dynamics in the global bulk metal markets could become even more volatile, and the very frameworks used to set prices for certain commodities might undergo disruptive changes, significantly elevating market risks. The challenges this situation poses for China’s nascent mining companies are simply unimaginable.
Judging from the three “once-in-a-century” acquisition deals mentioned above, corporate mergers and acquisitions in the international metals and minerals market will increasingly target larger-scale entities. The primary goal of these mergers is to expand and strengthen core businesses, divest relatively inefficient assets, and further consolidate and enhance the dominant position of leading companies in the industry—thus aiming to secure greater, even monopolistic, influence in the global metals and minerals market. Particularly at a time when the Trump administration in the United States has raised the banner of “America First” protectionism, these three cases are likely to spark significant speculation about the global strategic realignment of critical mineral resources. In the future, the global metals and mining industry may increasingly move toward oligopolistic dominance, with leading companies exerting ever stronger influence over industry trends in the commodity markets. For Chinese mining enterprises that are striving to gain greater influence in the international market, the external development environment they face will become even more challenging. Meanwhile, for China, which has consistently upheld the principles of reform and opening-up, if these three acquisitions succeed, they could very likely trigger massive price fluctuations—or even tsunami-like reactions—in the domestic markets for related metal and mineral commodities, posing an extremely serious threat to China’s security of supply of these key mineral resources.
2.2 The United States covets the resources of its neighboring countries, with national security as its underlying motive.
Since 2024, both the new and previous U.S. administrations have expressed interest in acquiring Greenland. According to a comment by David Holland, a climate scientist at New York University, cited by the Associated Press, beneath Greenland’s massive ice sheet lie oil reserves estimated at billions of barrels, as well as vast mineral resources, including iron ore deposits of enormous scale and high quality, ruby mines, gold deposits, and exceptionally abundant reserves of rare earth elements and uranium. Relevant data indicate that the Kvanefjord region in southwestern Greenland holds rare earth mineral reserves estimated at about 619 million tons, ranking it second globally. Moreover, in recent years, substantial offshore oil resources have been discovered near Nuuk, Greenland’s capital, and along its eastern coast, where increasingly extensive exploration has revealed some of the largest hydrocarbon reserves in the Arctic region. All these resources are critical minerals essential for the economic development of various countries. In particular, rare earth elements—vital raw materials for products such as mobile phones and electric vehicles, as well as for advanced military weapons—are a cornerstone of U.S. global dominance. However, since these metal resources are currently predominantly supplied by China, this has struck a nerve with the U.S. government, which is deeply committed to ensuring the security of its industrial and supply chains. The U.S. government views controlling Greenland and diversifying the sources of rare earth resources as strategically vital for America.
Meanwhile, Greenland’s geographic location also plays an extremely important strategic role in U.S. surveillance of military activities in the Arctic and the North Atlantic regions, serving as a key forward outpost and pivotal hub for U.S. air defense and missile defense operations. Currently, the United States has established the Pituffik Air Base in the northern part of the island and has fully deployed intelligence-gathering facilities, missile-warning systems, and satellite-monitoring stations there. These assets are used to track information on passing vessels and to monitor and provide early warnings of ballistic missiles aimed at the continental United States. In 2023, U.S. Air Force F-35A fighter jets were deployed to Pituffik Air Base for the first time, enhancing U.S. military deterrence against relevant countries and regions in the Arctic region. Moreover, as global climate change continues to warm the planet, the navigable window and extent of the Arctic routes near Greenland are steadily expanding. In the future, the Bering Strait route—a crucial passage for Asia-Europe trade—will inevitably pass through the vast territory of Greenland. By gaining control over Greenland, the United States could effectively establish de facto control over Arctic shipping lanes, thereby enabling it to adopt “chokehold” strategies and measures—both economic and military—in response to countries that the U.S. identifies as adversaries or competitors.
It should be said that the United States, which has long relied on resource exploitation for its growth, has harbored ambitions toward Greenland for a very long time. As early as 1860, then-U.S. President Andrew Johnson had already commissioned an investigation into Greenland. In 1867, then-U.S. Secretary of State William Seward first expressed “great interest” in purchasing the world’s largest island—a notion that, nearly 160 years later, truly demonstrates how long this ambition has been simmering.
Moreover, in January 2025, after Trump took office, he unilaterally renamed the Gulf of Mexico the “American Gulf” and even crazily and absurdly proposed the idea of merging Canada and Mexico. Under the core mindset of “American interests,” “American security” will once again dominate a new round of resource plunder and aggression—including land resources. The U.S. government’s understanding and perception of resource security have long been laid bare—“the heart of Sima Zhao is now evident.” In a nutshell, the ultimate goal behind the United States’ covetousness for the resources of neighboring countries is to ensure both U.S. national security and resource security.
2.3 Technological development is placing higher demands on energy needs.
During the 2025 Spring Festival, a “DeepSeek whirlwind” originating from China swept across the globe, sending shockwaves through the global artificial intelligence (AI) technology research and development sector—particularly in the United States—and propelling AI technology to a whole new level. AI powered by big data will significantly elevate global technological standards, reshape the overall direction of future global development, and even alter the landscape of global competition. As technology continues to advance and intelligent computing power dramatically increases, future applications of technology and data processing will place ever-higher and more stringent demands on energy supply and the sustained stability of energy and power equipment. In recent years, due to the round-the-clock operations of data centers, some major tech companies—such as Google and Microsoft—have seen their annual electricity consumption exceed that of several sovereign nations around the world. According to an analysis by Michael Thomas, in 2023, Google and Microsoft each consumed over 24 terawatt-hours of electricity—a figure that surpassed the annual electricity consumption of more than 100 countries worldwide, including Iceland, Ghana, and Tunisia. This amount is equivalent to the entire annual electricity consumption of a country with a population exceeding 10 million, such as Azerbaijan.
In the future, ensuring the supply of energy and electricity means guaranteeing the implementation and application of science and technology in the fields of economy, national defense, and national security. This also partly explains why the United States has consistently focused its energy sector on traditional fossil fuels. For China, the share of new energy sources in our energy mix is steadily increasing; according to data from the National Bureau of Statistics, this share has already approached 30%. As new energy sources continue to develop, three key issues are increasingly becoming central concerns for China’s energy and mineral sector: how to balance the sustainable supply of electricity with the growing role of new energy sources, how to ensure that new energy sources and traditional fossil fuels work together to underpin and stabilize China’s economy, and how to determine the threshold range for maintaining a stable energy supply under critical or extreme circumstances. Meanwhile, as new energy continues to expand, the demand for new-energy minerals such as lithium, nickel, cobalt, silver, and graphite will also become a major challenge that China must address in its efforts to secure strategic mineral resources. From this perspective, the rapid advancement of technology places ever-more stringent demands on energy security for countries around the world, raising higher expectations for the stability of supplies of both conventional and new-energy mineral resources. Only by fully addressing the issue of stable supply of relevant mineral resources for the new-energy sector can we ensure the stability of China’s energy supply and bolster our confidence in the face of competition among major powers.
Based on the above analysis, since 2023, the global economic development has been quietly giving rise to new shifts in the international mining landscape. Whether in terms of corporate mergers and asset restructuring or national strategies for ensuring resource supply, the strong alliances among international mining giants—and the increasingly close ties between capital, national will, and the mining sector—are becoming ever more evident. In the future, against the backdrop of intensifying great-power competition, China’s strategic mineral resource sector will face even more severe and complex internal and external challenges, which will manifest themselves specifically in the following aspects.
3.1 The fundamental approach and planning for resource security based on long-term sustainable development are urgently needed.
Resource competition forms the foundation of great-power rivalry. In recent years, as China has placed increasing emphasis on strategic mineral resources, it has stepped up its efforts—both domestically and internationally—to secure access to critical minerals such as copper and iron ore, achieving some promising results. In 2024, China’s Zijin Mining and Luoyang Molybdenum have already entered the global top ten in copper production, while China’s Chinalco and China Baowu have successfully taken control of the Simandou iron ore mine in Guinea and are now leading its development. However, judging from emerging trends in the international mining sector since 2023, major international mining giants are preparing for a new round of large-scale mergers and acquisitions. Meanwhile, Western capital and the national will of the United States and its allies continue to exert growing influence on the resource front. Recently, the U.S. approach to securing lithium resources in South America, as well as its “claims” over certain mineral resources in Ukraine, both underscore that China’s future economic development will face increasingly severe challenges in securing overseas mineral resources. It is imperative that China conduct a rational analysis and assessment of its long-term capacity to ensure the stable supply of resources needed for the new journey toward Chinese-style modernization. On this basis, we must promptly formulate fundamental guidelines and plans for the long-term sustainable development of mineral resources—guidelines and plans that support both our economic growth and national security. This calls for us to adopt a super-long-term perspective and take a holistic, forward-looking approach to strategy.
3.2 Sustainable resource acquisition faces significant challenges.
As the process of industrialization advances, humanity’s efforts to acquire mineral resources have steadily intensified, leading to a year-on-year decline in the natural endowment of mineral resources worldwide. Meanwhile, under the backdrop of great-power competition, political orientations and biases have complicated relations between the United States and its allies on one hand, and China on the other. China’s overseas resource acquisition is increasingly facing direct export restrictions imposed by resource-supplying countries, as well as disruptions caused by extreme incidents such as production stoppages and strikes instigated by domestic labor unions, local communities, and hostile, malicious forces within those countries. Moreover, this phenomenon is spreading from just a few individual countries to an increasing number of nations. Furthermore, China’s overseas mineral rights development and the channels for bringing back strategically important resources are continually beset by numerous uncertainties. At the same time, new international trends—such as “century-scale mergers,” “super-acquisitions,” and even demands for territorial acquisitions—driven by both national will and international capital, all orchestrated by major global mining giants, serve as a stark warning: in the future, China’s sustainable access to resources will face ever-greater challenges. We must therefore be proactive and strategic in our planning, devising targeted solutions that will enable us to remain steadfast and unshaken, no matter which way the winds may blow—from east, west, north, or south.
3.3 Balanced development between emerging energy and traditional energy sectors is critically important.
Energy is the foundation of a country’s industry and economy. In the face of developments in the energy sector, although all countries recognize the importance of developing new energy sources, significant differences remain among major economies. Currently, the European Union continues to champion carbon taxes, calling for energy conservation, emission reduction, and lower carbon emissions; China has already become a global leader in the application of new energy technologies; meanwhile, the Trump administration in the United States withdrew from the Paris Agreement in January 2025, shifting its focus back to emphasizing the importance of traditional energy sources; and Japan, constrained by its limited natural resource endowments, remains committed to the development and deployment of nuclear and hydrogen energy. Therefore, as we confront the ongoing development and mutual substitution between new and traditional energy sources, and as the demand for stable energy supplies driven by technological advancements continues to rise, our country must maintain strategic clarity. Based on our national conditions and with an eye toward supporting future economic growth and national security, we must strike a balance between new and traditional energy development—achieving a dynamic equilibrium that ensures reliable supply, fosters technological innovation and leadership, promotes energy conservation and emission reduction, and supports sustainable development—all while maintaining high-quality growth. We must avoid blindly following trends or chasing after fleeting fads. Ultimately, we aim to realize the synergistic effect of “1+1>2” between new and traditional energy sources, providing a robust and solid foundation for our nation’s economic and technological advancement.
3.4 It will become more difficult to effectively gain influence in the commodity markets.
In recent years, China’s various efforts to ensure the stable supply of mineral resources have to some extent helped reduce our country’s reliance on foreign sources for strategic minerals, thereby enhancing our capacity to acquire and secure overseas resources. However, given the still highly complex external environment facing China’s economic development—and the abundance of uncertainties—overall prospects remain far from optimistic. Particularly since 2023, news and rumors about mega-mergers among global mining giants have continued to circulate vigorously. Coupled with the “America First” approach adopted by the Trump administration, should any of these merger plans succeed, China’s overseas mineral rights to strategic minerals will undoubtedly face unprecedented challenges, confronting the industry with the relentless dominance of “giant conglomerates.” As a result, it will become increasingly difficult for China to effectively gain influence in the market for strategic minerals in the future. This outcome will ultimately lead directly to a further sharp decline—or even loss—of China’s already limited influence in related commodity markets. Faced with escalating uncertainties and mounting challenges, China must, in the future, adopt a multifaceted approach, including robust supply-side reforms and demand-side stimulus measures, to ensure the steady operation and high-quality development of our economy.
3.5 Superior resources are increasingly becoming a necessary countermeasure in the competition among major powers.
Natural endowment factors often result in certain mineral resources being concentrated in just a few countries (or regions). Compared to other countries that have average or scarce resource levels, a country that is relatively rich in specific resources is referred to as having “dominant mineral resources” or “advantageous resources.” Such advantageous resources serve as crucial tools and primary means for a country to effectively, proactively, and powerfully mount countermeasures in the competition among major powers. Meanwhile, compensating for and acquiring resources that are relatively scarce within one’s own country is an imperative that a nation’s government must consistently pursue in order to avoid falling at a disadvantage in international competition. It is precisely because of the abundant rare-earth resources hidden beneath Greenland’s ice sheet, as well as the rich oil and natural-gas reserves in the Gulf of Mexico, that successive U.S. administrations—and now the newly inaugurated Trump administration—have coveted these resources and sought to bring them under their control.
3.6 The effective utilization of renewable resources has become a powerful lever for ensuring future resource supply.
As the industrialization process advances, primary mineral resources—after being extensively exploited—are transformed into end-of-life materials in various forms, ultimately ending up piled up and buried. In fact, these resources are far from being entirely useless; with thorough recycling and reuse, they can once again demonstrate their value in both national production and daily life. This is precisely the significance of secondary resources. Over the past four decades since the reform and opening-up policy was launched, China’s rapid economic growth has largely been built on the extensive exploitation and consumption of primary resources. However, given that China’s industrialization period has been relatively short, our system for the circular recycling of secondary resources remains incomplete, and relevant industry regulations are lacking, making it difficult to achieve rational and effective utilization of these resources. As China’s modern industrialization continues to advance, a massive volume of secondary resources will keep being generated continuously. The effective utilization of these secondary resources will help China build an intensive, resource-saving market economy. Since these resources have already undergone smelting and processing and now largely remain within China’s borders, they essentially represent another concentrated form of “domestic resources.” Secondary resources can be recycled and reused effectively over the long term; therefore, the sustained, efficient, and comprehensive utilization of secondary resources will inevitably become one of the key pillars of China’s future strategic efforts to ensure the stable supply of critical mineral resources. This, in turn, is crucial for the long-term sustainable development of China’s socio-economic system.
As “industrial grain,” the supply of metal mineral resources—especially those of strategic national metals—is a critical guarantee for the stable operation of a country’s industrial manufacturing sector. As the world’s manufacturing hub and with our ongoing industrialization process, China’s demand for metal mineral resources will remain consistently high. Should the supply of these resources be disrupted or cut off, it would inflict immeasurable damage on economic development, potentially even leading to an economic “standstill” or regression, jeopardizing national security and giving rise to consequences that are simply unimaginable. Since 2023, the global economic environment has become increasingly complex and uncertain, and the outlook for international mining development has grown ever more elusive and volatile. For China, we are now at a crucial stage of accelerating our transformation and upgrading efforts and vigorously pursuing high-quality development. We are also in a pivotal period of comprehensively advancing the cause of building a strong nation and achieving national rejuvenation through Chinese-style modernization. Therefore, ensuring the secure and stable supply of metal mineral resources is of paramount importance. In light of this, under the new economic development landscape, China must promptly adopt strategic and forward-looking policy measures tailored to our mineral resource needs, making timely adjustments and implementing multiple, coordinated strategies to safeguard the security of our strategic mineral resources.
4.1 We must uphold reform and opening-up and unswervingly promote high-quality joint construction. The Belt and Road
For a major economy like China, resource security cannot rely solely on domestic resources, nor can we afford to overconsume them. We must deepen reform and opening-up to inject fresh vitality into the secure supply of strategic mineral resources and economic development. We should unswervingly promote high-quality joint construction of the Belt and Road Initiative, engaging in comprehensive dialogue with host countries on cooperation mechanisms, taxation, culture, and legal matters, thereby avoiding cultural, religious, legal, and fiscal conflicts and disputes during overseas investment. This will enable mutually beneficial outcomes, common development, and green growth. We need to strengthen our diplomatic efforts toward major powers, actively encourage enterprises going abroad to cultivate a sense of social responsibility, vigorously implement ESG initiatives, and effectively promote our corporate image within local communities, thus establishing a positive international image for China. By leveraging diplomatic channels, we can win the support of political parties and citizens in host countries; through joint construction and mutual assistance, we can earn the trust of local communities and trade unions, safeguarding and enhancing the rights, quality, and efficiency of China’s overseas investments in the metals and mining sector. By jointly building the Belt and Road Initiative, we can connect China with the world, break down and reshape the increasingly pronounced global trend of “fragmentation,” and rebuild a new paradigm for economic globalization.
4.2 Accelerate the development of a regularized regulatory system and emergency response plan for national metallic mineral resources.
As the world’s largest consumer of metal minerals and a major producer and processor of metals, China must implement regular, systematic oversight to ensure the security of its strategically important metal mineral resources. At the national level, it is essential to develop necessary emergency response plans, ensuring that there are clear guidelines to follow during critical market moments and in the event of unexpected emergencies—only then can we be prepared for any eventualities. We must fully leverage the role of industry associations in market supervision, industry coordination, and public opinion monitoring, and conduct thorough market research. Moreover, we need to precisely target and effectively address the “pain points” within the industry, delivering targeted and accurate interventions. Most importantly, we must attach great significance to maintaining confidentiality throughout the policy-making process, rigorously preventing and eliminating the widespread dissemination of market-related information before crucial decision-making stages.
4.3 In the field of new energy materials, it is imperative to strictly control inefficient and ineffective production capacity. Growth
In the field of new-energy materials, particularly those centered on lithium, the nation must make preparations well in advance to prevent a repeat of the “iron ore tragedy.” It is imperative to promptly ascertain the extent of overseas investments in lithium resources, thoroughly understand the alignment between total lithium demand and production capacity requirements, and proactively plan for resource development. Moreover, timely policy interventions are needed to curb the rapid expansion of overcapacity, formulate appropriate strategies for existing high-quality production capacities, restrict the launch of electric vehicle products from non-mainstream and non-traditional automakers, and limit the entry into the market of non-mainstream lithium-powered vehicles—including lithium-powered bicycles—thereby avoiding unnecessary increases in demand for lithium resources driven by excess capacity. The market’s public opinion must be rigorously examined and monitored to keep expectations in the new-energy sector from overheating; whenever necessary, market sentiment should be appropriately “cooled down.” We must also encourage the development of existing domestic resources, swiftly establish comprehensive policies for lithium-battery recycling and reuse, and incentivize large, capable state-owned and centrally-administered enterprises to enter the field of lithium-resource regeneration and recycling. By fully harnessing both primary and recycled lithium resources, we can maximize the effective utilization of domestic resources and ensure their role as a “stabilizing anchor” in the economy.
4.4 Careful planning, a long-term, dynamic, and rational strategy. Collection and storage
After World War II, peace and development became the dominant global themes. As an effective means of addressing a nation’s high dependence on foreign sources for scarce resources during peacetime, national strategic stockpiling has been frequently employed by countries since the end of World War II. According to data from the United States Geological Survey (USGS), since 1955, the United States has been engaging in national stockpiling of tantalum—a critical minor metal resource—in order to ensure sufficient resource security amid its competition with the Soviet Union in the aerospace and aviation fields. Based on this case, it is recommended that China should, at an appropriate time, step up its efforts to stockpile strategically important and relatively scarce resources such as chromium, cobalt, tantalum, niobium, manganese, and copper. Furthermore, enterprises should be encouraged to enhance their corporate social responsibility-driven stockpiling initiatives, and effective trade mechanisms should be leveraged during periods of low prices for these commodities to secure resources and safeguard national security. Drawing on the models and practices of relevant national strategic reserve systems in the United States, Japan, and other countries, it is suggested that the relevant Chinese government departments promptly design an optimal strategy tailored to China’s specific national conditions. By adopting a diversified and flexible reserve portfolio approach, China can confidently address potential resource bottlenecks and supply disruptions.
4.5 Plan for long-term advantages. Resource Development Plan
As China’s inherent advantages in key metallic mineral resources gradually erode, it is strongly recommended that the country adopt a long-term perspective on resource competition and carefully plan the development of China’s strategic advantageous metal industries. This includes, but is not limited to, formulating long-term development plans for these advantageous metals and making well-considered, forward-looking decisions. Strategic mineral resources will undoubtedly serve as the cornerstone of future great-power competition; we must avoid “focusing on small gains at the expense of larger objectives” and prevent short-term economic interests from undermining our long-term competitiveness in resource markets. Therefore, we should appropriately reduce or even halt the export of primary products from advantageous metal minerals such as tungsten, antimony, and rare earth elements. As for the resources currently under our control, we must regularly monitor them and ensure their orderly exploitation through long-term resource development plans, thereby maintaining effective market demand. We must also rigorously address the disorderly competition among enterprises within the industry, using stringent safety and environmental protection policies to effectively guide inefficient production capacity out of the market, ensuring that strong, capable large enterprises can consolidate resources and achieve efficient production. Moreover, we should encourage technological research and development at the downstream application end of these metal varieties, continuously attracting and guiding metal mining and processing enterprises toward high-tech, value-added application fields.
4.6 Focus on forging a new pattern of resource security that integrates and coexists with both native and recycled resources.
It is recommended that management authorities at all levels, in accordance with the requirements of the newly revised “Mineral Resources Law,” should perform their duties as resource stewards, carry out thorough geological exploration, and rigorously and effectively crack down on “illegal” trade in mineral resources both domestically and internationally. It is imperative to strictly prohibit practices such as “blending inferior goods with superior ones” and “substituting inferior products for superior ones.” Based on the needs of key national industries and major projects, we must formulate a long-term, phased development plan for China’s strategic mineral resources and establish a stringent monitoring mechanism for resource exploitation, thereby preventing both “small mines being developed on a large scale” and “large mines being developed on a small scale.” We must adopt a gradual, adaptive approach tailored to changing circumstances and conditions, and intensify efforts to promote the full and rational utilization of domestic recycled resources. From the perspective of long-term strategic resource management, we must focus on building a robust domestic resource circulation system that integrates both primary and recycled resources, and create a new paradigm for ensuring the supply of strategic mineral resources.
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