“ The State Council has repeatedly emphasized the need to shift from managing assets to managing capital. Currently, there are problems in the management of state-owned capital. ”

　　 —— Cai Jiming

　　In the view of Cai Jiming, a deputy to the National People's Congress and a professor at Tsinghua University, if officials from the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) were also appointed as chairpersons of state-owned enterprises, these enterprises could become a vehicle for the officials to exploit their positions for personal gain. Conversely, since the heads of state-owned enterprises are largely officials themselves, managing these enterprises could easily lead to corrupt practices. “ There are problems with the overlapping appointments among leaders of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, leaders of state-owned enterprises, and heads of state-owned enterprises. ”

　　 “ State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission ” Its full name is the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, which both manages and supervises. However, “ Can a manager also serve as a supervisor? ?” Cai Jiming posed a counterquestion. He suggested that oversight authority should be transferred to the National People's Congress or its Standing Committee, and a Supervisory Commission for State-Owned Capital or State-Owned Assets should be established. This would separate management functions from oversight functions, thereby enhancing efficiency while also serving the public interest.

　　The Dual Meaning of the Mixed-Ownership Economy

　　 “ The mixed-ownership economy has two meanings. ” Cai Jiming explained.

　　At the macro level, it refers to a mixed ownership structure—in which a country or region’s ownership structure includes both public-sector economies such as state-owned and collectively-owned enterprises, as well as non-public-sector economies such as individual, private, and foreign-invested enterprises. It also encompasses joint-venture and cooperative enterprises that have both state-owned and collectively-owned components.

　　Since the reform and opening-up, the private sector has undergone a significant transformation in the ruling party’s programmatic documents—from being absolutely prohibited as an adversary to the public sector, to becoming a necessary complement to the public sector, and ultimately emerging as an important component of the socialist market economy. Together with the public sector, it has become an essential part of the basic economic system for the primary stage of socialism.

　　Moreover, the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China pointed out that a mixed-ownership economy—characterized by cross-shareholding and mutual integration among state-owned capital, collective capital, and non-public capital—is an important institutional form for realizing the basic economic system.

　　At the micro level, this refers to mixed-ownership enterprises—companies within which both public and private ownership elements coexist. This includes enterprises established through joint investment by investors of different ownership types, as well as ordinary joint-stock enterprises.

　　Cai Jiming pointed out that these two levels of mixed ownership are intrinsically linked: the mixed-ownership economic structure represents an external, mechanical combination of public and private sectors, whereas mixed-ownership enterprises—specifically joint-stock companies—constitute an internal, organic integration of public and private interests. The mixed-ownership economic structure serves as the objective foundation upon which mixed-ownership enterprises arise and develop, while mixed-ownership enterprises are both the inevitable outcome and the concrete manifestation of the evolution of the mixed-ownership structure.

　　The data shows that, 2012 In that year, the share of tax revenue from the non-public sector in total tax revenue reached 73.1% Fixed-asset investment accounted for a share of total fixed-asset investment in the entire society. 64.1% ; As of 2014 By the end of the year, the number of private enterprises had reached 1546.37 Ten thousand households, with an employed workforce exceeding... 2.496 Hundreds of millions of people, with registered capital exceeding 59.21 Trillions of yuan. Currently, the non-public sector economy is contributing to... GDP Its contribution rate exceeds half, accounting for the newly created jobs. 80% The above, and has already become a driving force in technological innovation.

　　Meanwhile, as of 2012 By year-end, the total number of listed companies controlled by central enterprises and their subsidiaries is: 378 Home, where the proportion of non-state-owned equity exceeds. 53% A listed company controlled by a local state-owned enterprise. 681 households, among which the proportion of non-state-owned equity exceeds 60% Currently, there are state-owned, domestically and internationally listed companies that are controlled by the state. 1100 The Yu family’s state-owned equity and realized profits each account for a certain share of those held by state-owned and state-controlled enterprises nationwide. 17% and 46% Right. Listed companies with state-owned holding have become the backbone of the state-owned economy.

　　The profit-sharing ratio of central state-owned energy enterprises is relatively low.

　　 “ Compared with other countries, Chinese state-owned energy enterprises pay a lower proportion of their profits to the government. ” Cai Jiming admitted frankly. 2008 Year ~2010 Year, the power industry participated in the pilot program. 10 The proportion of annual net profit paid by state-owned wholly-owned enterprises is: 5% or 10% ; from 2011 Starting from the year, the remittance ratio will be increased to... 10% or 15% And several countries abroad are... 30%~50% 。

　　Due to stringent market-entry restrictions, the oil and gas industry—whether in upstream resource allocation and extraction, midstream processing, or downstream sales networks—is essentially dominated by a market structure monopolized by the three major state-owned oil companies. 2011 In that year, PetroChina’s oil and natural gas production accounted for, respectively, a certain percentage of the nation’s total output. 53% and 68% , Sinopec holds 20.4% and 13.2% , CNOOC holds. 23% and 15.1% As of 2012 By the end of the year, the country's onshore oil and gas pipelines for long-distance transportation... 70% It is controlled by PetroChina Pipeline Company. Sinopec remains China's largest retailer of refined oil products, and the number of gas stations controlled by Sinopec and PetroChina together exceeds the total number of gas stations nationwide. 54%。

　　Cai Jiming stated that among the three major energy sectors, electricity can be said to be the one with the lowest degree of marketization, the weakest level of competition, and the lowest status for the non-public sector—so much so that some in society hold the view that... “ Ten years after the electricity reform, we’ve returned to square one. ” To date, China has not yet truly established a comprehensive system covering power generation, transmission, distribution, and retail electricity sales. 4 A structure in which each stage is separate.

　　 “ In the two major markets—power generation and power transmission, distribution, and sales—the power-generation market is relatively open, allowing any capital to enter. ” Cai Jiming analyzed, 2010 By year-end, there are nationwide power generation enterprises above a designated size. 3893 Households—but the five major state-owned power generation groups, along with Guohua Power, China Resources Power, CITIC Power, and CGN Group, hold a dominant position, whether measured by installed capacity, which reflects production capacity, or by power generation volume, which reflects market share.

　　 “ Non-public economy 36 item ”( “Several Opinions of the State Council on Encouraging, Supporting, and Guiding the Development of the Non-Public Sector Economy,” Guofa [ 2005 ] 3 Number ) and “ New non-public economy 36 item ”( “Several Opinions of the State Council on Encouraging and Guiding the Healthy Development of Private Investment,” Guofa [ 2010 ] 13 Number ) All emphasize the need to create a rule-of-law environment, policy environment, and market environment that ensures equal competition and treats all economic sectors—both public and non-public—on an equal footing. Further efforts will be made to ease market access and encourage and support non-public capital to enter infrastructure, monopolized industries, public utilities, as well as other sectors and fields not prohibited by laws and regulations.

　　The state has introduced incentive policies to encourage private enterprises to enter monopolized industries, while also imposing certain restrictions. According to the "Guiding Opinions on Promoting the Adjustment of State-Owned Capital and the Restructuring of State-Owned Enterprises," the state-owned economy should maintain absolute control over key sectors and critical areas, including the seven major industries: military industry, power grid and electricity, petroleum and petrochemicals, telecommunications, coal, civil aviation, and shipping. Among these, for central enterprises operating in crucial resource development sectors such as the military industry, oil, and natural gas, as well as in infrastructure fields like power grids and telecommunications, state-owned capital should retain either sole ownership or absolute controlling stakes.

　　Cai Jiming believes that for many years, private enterprises have been calling for access to the competitive segments of the aforementioned natural monopoly industries—but lacking practical and feasible implementation rules, they often encounter difficulties. “ Glass door ” For example, in every stage—such as oil exploration, import, refining, wholesale, retail, and transportation—private enterprises simply cannot compete on an equal footing with state-owned giants like CNPC. —— Some of its branches implement oil transportation prices that are several times lower than those offered by private enterprises. “ There's a distinction between inside and outside. ” Price discrimination policy.

　　However, the above-mentioned situation is about to ease. The “Suggestions of the CPC Central Committee on Formulating the 13th Five-Year Plan” points out that we should accelerate the opening up of competitive businesses in naturally monopolized sectors such as electricity, telecommunications, transportation, oil, natural gas, and municipal public utilities; reduce government intervention in price formation; fully liberalize prices for goods and services in competitive sectors; and liberalize prices for competitive segments in areas including electricity, oil, natural gas, transportation, and telecommunications.

　　It is understood that currently there are already 6 A private enterprise has obtained non-state-owned trade import qualifications. 2016 The annual quota for non-state-owned crude oil imports increased year-on-year. 133%。

　　The functions of state-owned asset management and supervision should be separated.

　　How can we maintain the mutual interaction between state-owned enterprises and private enterprises to promote harmonious economic and social development? Cai Jiming suggests establishing and improving the governance mechanisms for mixed-ownership enterprises.

　　As for how it works, Cai Jiming said: “ According to the State Council’s “Opinions on Developing a Mixed-Ownership Economy in State-Owned Enterprises,” further establish and implement the status of enterprises as market entities. The government shall not interfere with enterprises’ autonomous operations, and shall ensure that the board of directors exercises its authority over the selection, performance evaluation, and compensation management of senior management personnel, including members of the management team, thereby safeguarding enterprises’ genuine status as market entities. ”

　　At the same time, it is also necessary to regulate corporate shareholders. ( Big ) The relationship of powers and responsibilities among the shareholders’ meeting, the board of directors, the management team, the supervisory board, and the Party organization shall be governed by the articles of association. Capital oversight shall rely on market-based personnel selection, and operations shall be conducted in strict accordance with established rules, thereby establishing a corporate governance structure that features clear positioning, balanced rights and responsibilities, coordinated operations, and effective checks and balances. We will promote a professional manager system for mixed-ownership enterprises, establish market-oriented mechanisms for personnel selection, employment, incentives, and constraints, and adopt market-driven approaches to recruit professional managers who will assume legal responsibility for enterprise management and operations, while also ensuring smooth channels for the transition of status between incumbent management personnel and professional managers.

　　Cai Jiming also suggested that the functions of state-owned asset management and supervision should be separated, and officials from the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) should not be interchangeable with heads of state-owned enterprises. On the one hand, how can a management body simultaneously oversee both its own performance in managing enterprises and the performance of those enterprises? On the other hand, many SASAC officials concurrently hold or switch to the position of chairman of state-owned enterprises, while conversely, many chairmen of state-owned enterprises concurrently hold or switch to the position of director of the SASAC.

　　He questioned: How could a director of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), who was either transferred from or concurrently held a position in a state-owned enterprise, possibly supervise objectively and rigorously the very state-owned enterprises he had once headed? Not to mention that, like Jiang Jiemin, who served as both General Manager and Party Secretary of the China National Petroleum Corporation and Chairman of the Board of Directors of PetroChina Co., Ltd., was himself a corrupt official within a state-owned enterprise to begin with. After his transfer to become the director of the SASAC under the State Council, how could we possibly expect him to manage and oversee PetroChina effectively?

　　In light of this, he hopes that the supervisory functions over state-owned assets should be exercised by the National People's Congress State-Owned Assets Supervision Committee.