China is not only a major energy producer and consumer but also a global leader in the research and development of new-energy technologies. It has become a heavyweight player in the international energy arena, and countries around the world are paying close attention to China’s global energy strategy. On the other hand, China only became a net importer of crude oil in 2006, meaning its global energy strategy got off to a relatively late start. Currently... Global Energy Situation Significant changes are underway, heralding revolutionary adjustments in both energy production and consumption. After more than half a century of international cooperation, China’s global energy strategy has essentially reached maturity. Its strategic objectives have shifted from merely enhancing energy strength to transforming that strength into a shift in energy power. This paper explores the evolutionary stages, material foundations, contextual realities, and strategic framework of China’s global energy strategy. Using the Eurasian continent as a regional case study, it examines the role and impact of the Belt and Road Initiative on China’s global energy strategy.

  The Evolution Stages of China’s Global Energy Strategy: From the “Nascent Stage” and “Development Stage” to the “Mature Stage”

Since the founding of New China in 1949, China’s global energy strategy has gone through three stages of development: the “incubation period,” the “growth period,” and the “maturity period.” During this time, China’s practice of international energy cooperation has also undergone three distinct phases: The first phase saw China transition from heavily relying on Soviet oil imports to achieving self-sufficiency and eventually becoming a net exporter; the second phase marked the shift from “bringing in” foreign technology and resources to becoming a net importer; and the third phase involved moving from “going out” to engage in multifaceted, globally-oriented energy cooperation and gradually taking the lead in such partnerships. The launch of the major “Belt and Road” initiative signifies the full establishment of China’s global energy strategy. (See Table 1 for details.)

Table 1: Stages of the Evolution of China’s Global Energy Strategy

In the early years following the founding of New China, faced with the economic blockade imposed by Western countries, China was compelled to engage in energy cooperation only with socialist nations such as the Soviet Union. Ideological considerations, shared national interests among countries, and collective security were key driving forces behind this cooperation. For China, it was also driven by the need to build up strategic petroleum reserves. The bilateral cooperation between China and the Soviet Union—covering areas such as oil imports and technological equipment—laid the foundation for what would later become the "nascent stage" of China's global energy strategy. At that time, China's foreign energy policy was merely one component of its broader foreign policy, and the degree of cooperation entirely depended on the ebb and flow of relations between China and the Soviet Union. In the late 1950s, due to profound ideological and policy differences between China and the Soviet Union, their cooperative relationship broke down. As a result, China stepped up its efforts in oil production and returned its energy policy to the independent and self-reliant approach adopted in the early years after the founding of the country. Consequently, China transformed from a net importer of oil into a net exporter of oil.

From 1978 to 1992, China’s petroleum exports gradually declined. This period marked the incubation phase of China’s comprehensive energy cooperation—a policy of international energy collaboration characterized by market opening and the “bringing in” of capital, technology, and equipment in exchange for energy exports. Among these efforts, offshore oil exploration and technological cooperation emerged as a new dimension and key focus of collaboration. During this period, China’s practice of external energy cooperation was distinguished by an increasingly diversified range of partner countries and an expansion of cooperative activities beyond just oil and gas. China’s external energy strategy also adopted new approaches; yet, it remained closely aligned with the overarching framework of the country’s foreign policy and was still confined to bilateral, inter-state international relations.

Since China became a net importer of refined petroleum products in 1993 and a net importer of crude oil in 1996, in the early 1990s, in order to implement the central government’s policy of “fully leveraging both domestic and international resources and markets,” China began to pursue a “going global” strategy and actively engaged in international energy cooperation. During this period, China’s energy diplomacy achieved significant results: it joined numerous multilateral and bilateral, regional and global cooperation mechanisms; established multiple international cooperation zones for oil and gas across five continents, securing substantial stakes in oil and gas resources; and also set up a comprehensive system for foreign energy trade.

From the “bringing in” approach adopted during the reform and opening-up period to the comprehensive “going out” strategy implemented after 1993, China’s global energy strategy has entered a “development phase.” This phase is characterized by the full-scale utilization of energy diplomacy—activities related to energy that are led by the state, involving energy enterprises and other actors, and leveraging diplomatic resources to safeguard national energy security or pursue other national interests through energy-related relationships. During this period, China’s foreign energy practices have also transitioned from being primarily bilateral in nature to becoming globally oriented, based on both bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

Following the 2008 financial crisis, oil prices remained low, and consuming countries increasingly strengthened their influence in the international energy market. As the world’s largest energy consumer and oil importer, China has accumulated decades of experience and lessons from its participation in international energy cooperation. As a result, China’s initiative in external energy cooperation has steadily grown, and the goals and direction of its cooperation have become increasingly clear. China’s global energy strategy is continuously maturing.

In September 2013, China launched the Belt and Road Initiative—a national strategy first proposed by China and driven at the highest level. The success or failure of this initiative is closely tied to China’s national prosperity and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. As is well known, energy plays a pivotal role in the Belt and Road Initiative and is often described as its “top priority.” Energy development not only concerns energy security for national and regional development but also touches upon the broader interests of both nations and regions. The purpose of international energy cooperation has shifted from merely acquiring or possessing energy resources themselves to achieving dual benefits—economic and environmental. China’s energy strategy has now truly developed its own comprehensive international development strategy, rather than merely being embedded within the country’s overall foreign policy. All of this clearly demonstrates that China’s global energy strategy has been formally established.

  The material foundation of China’s global energy strategy: the continuously strengthening energy power.

The three phases of China’s practice in foreign energy cooperation span more than half a century—from the early years of the founding of the People’s Republic of China through the period of rapid economic growth following the reform and opening-up policy, to the stage of China’s full integration into the global political and economic landscape. This period also marked a phase of large-scale accumulation of China’s energy strength. The continuous enhancement of China’s energy capabilities has laid a solid material foundation for the establishment and implementation of China’s global energy strategy.

A nation’s strength comes in two forms: hard power and soft power. Hard power refers to the dominant form of power, comprising the tangible, material resources—such as economic, military, and technological strengths—that make up a country’s overall capabilities. Energy power is a key component of a nation’s hard power, directly impacting national security and development. Energy power consists of several key elements: first, energy resource reserves, including both high-ratio reserves with favorable extraction conditions and strategic and commercial reserve levels; second, energy supply capacity—the degree of a nation’s energy security autonomy depends on how much or how little it relies on foreign energy supplies; third, energy import capability, measured by the diversity of import sources and the annual volume of imports; fourth, control over major energy transportation corridors, encompassing land-based railways, pipelines, and maritime routes, as well as ports and terminals connected to these pipelines; fifth, the capacity for research and development in energy technologies and the productivity of energy equipment; and sixth, the extent of participation in international energy finance (see Table 2 for details).

Table 2: Composition of China’s Energy Strength

From the founding of the People’s Republic of China to the formal establishment of China’s global energy strategy in 2013, China has achieved remarkable accomplishments in its practice of international energy cooperation, steadily enhancing its energy strength. Specifically: First, these efforts have helped China establish a complete energy industrial system—a system capable of sustaining itself, replicating itself, and upgrading itself even when all external connections are severed. Second, energy diplomacy has yielded significant results. Through high-level governmental exchanges and various summit meetings, China has signed intergovernmental energy cooperation agreements with numerous countries around the world and concluded framework agreements on energy cooperation with multiple international organizations, laying a solid foundation for China to engage in bilateral and multilateral international energy cooperation.

Third, China has established multiple international cooperation zones for oil and gas, securing a substantial volume of equity-based oil and gas resources. Currently, China is implementing over 100 international oil and gas cooperation projects in 33 countries worldwide and has set up five major international oil and gas cooperation zones. These zones primarily include: the African region centered on the Sudan project; the Middle East region centered on the Oman and Syria projects; the Central Asia–Russia region centered on the Kazakhstan project; the Americas region centered on the Venezuela and Ecuador projects; and the Asia-Pacific region centered on the Indonesia project. Together, these zones have created a global regional framework for China’s international oil and gas resource cooperation.

Fourth, an external energy trade system has been established. A preliminary energy import and export trade system has been set up, primarily focusing on oil, liquefied natural gas (LNG), natural gas, coal, and uranium ore. The primary mode of transportation is by tanker, supplemented by pipelines and a small amount by rail. On the international market, various trading methods—such as spot transactions, futures contracts, and long-term purchase agreements—are employed in combination. Fifth, Chinese energy companies have greatly enhanced their own international competitiveness. After years of development, China’s state-owned energy enterprises have not only mastered the operational models for international energy cooperation projects but have also accumulated extensive experience in capital management, contract negotiation, and other related areas. As a result, the returns from overseas investments have steadily improved, their strength continues to grow, and their international influence has significantly increased.

National power is composed of various forms of strength. From the perspective of the interplay between politics and economics, Charles P. Kindleberger defines power as the capacity to achieve specific goals—and the ability to wield that power effectively. According to the neorealist interpretation, an actor becomes powerful to the extent that its influence over other actors exceeds the influence those other actors exert on it. Thus, energy power refers to the capacity—a nation’s energy strength—that enables it to pursue its own interests and exert influence over other countries. Only when a country’s energy strength reaches a certain threshold can it acquire the energy power necessary to affect other nations and implement its global energy strategy. Otherwise, such a country simply lacks the qualification to formulate a global energy strategy in the first place. At present, there are relatively few countries in the world that truly possess a global energy strategy—limited mainly to a handful of developed nations and a small number of developing countries, such as China.

  The Realistic Context of China’s Global Energy Strategy: Energy Transition and Energy Revolution

The third major transformation in the history of human energy civilization manifested itself in the form of a sharp, sustained drop in oil prices by the end of 2014. This time, the shift is from fossil fuels to non-fossil energy sources. Energy transition This will fundamentally reshape the global energy order, much as the previous two transitions—from wood to coal and from coal to oil did. Nearly all countries will need to make policy choices and undertake energy adjustments that align with the direction of the energy transition. China, which currently still relies heavily on coal as its primary energy source, ... Energy Revolution The proposal is based on a strategic assessment of the changing global energy landscape. China’s global energy strategy is designed to support the energy revolution in China—specifically, the revolutions in energy production, energy consumption, energy technology, and energy governance—and thus requires a clear understanding of the real-world environment confronting the implementation of this strategy. The global energy landscape is beginning to undergo a transformation, characterized by the following features (see Table 3 for details):

Table 3: Global Energy Transition

The prolonged slump in oil prices signals the dawn of a “big energy” era. Unlike the previous two downturns—in 1986 and 2008—this round of falling oil prices is occurring during an energy transition. It reflects a battle for market share between conventional and unconventional oil and gas resources (shale and tight oil/gas), driven primarily by supply-and-demand fundamentals. With total production of both conventional and unconventional oil and gas exceeding consumption, downward pressure is further amplified, especially given the still-weak global economic outlook—a outlook that is particularly challenged by the sluggish recovery of emerging economies, including China. The unconventional oil and gas revolution in North America has served as a key catalyst behind this plunge in oil prices.

The global center of energy demand is gradually shifting from developed countries to developing countries, particularly emerging nations. Regionally, energy consumption is concentrated in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East. China has become the world’s largest energy consumer and crude oil importer. Its enormous consumption power and vast consumer market have given it significant influence over energy prices and are also reshaping its external energy relations.

The “Era of Big Energy” refers to a shift in which, from the perspective of energy sources, coal and conventional oil and gas resources are no longer the sole dominant players. Instead, unconventional hydrocarbons such as tight oil and gas, shale oil and gas, and coalbed methane—as well as new energy sources—are flourishing. Technologies for nuclear energy and various renewable energy sources, including solar, wind, and tidal energy, are becoming increasingly mature. From the standpoint of energy development regions, the focus of onshore oil and gas exploration and development is declining, while offshore oil and gas exploration and development efforts are intensifying. Moreover, in terms of the relationship between energy development and the natural environment, energy growth is increasingly constrained by factors such as climate change.

Energy power is being reconfigured, no longer centered solely on “oil power,” but also encompassing “energy supply rights,” “energy demand rights,” “energy technology rights,” “energy finance rights,” and the corresponding “energy carbon rights,” among others. Different regions and economies around the world, each endowed with distinct energy power advantages, now occupy their own positions within the global energy power structure.

“Energy supply power” refers to the absolute authority that energy-resource-rich countries wield in the global energy market simply because they own energy resources—for example, Saudi Arabia. Because of their advantageous energy supply power, resource-rich and producing countries occupy the apex of the global energy-power structure. “Energy demand power” refers to the strong market influence that energy-consuming countries possess due to their enormous consumption volumes—such as China, which has significant demand for energy resources. “Energy technology power” means that after entering the Third Industrial Revolution, countries equipped with advanced technologies gain the power to shape the future direction of global development—for example, Germany. “Energy finance power” refers to the greater say in energy pricing that countries with sophisticated financial systems and substantial influence over global finance can exert—for example, the United States. “Energy carbon power” signifies the relative power held by countries—such as those in the European Union—that have mastered the methods for calculating the carbon content of energy products and thus control the discourse on carbon politics within the low-carbon economic order.

  The Strategic Framework of China’s Global Energy Strategy: Goals, Mission, Implementation, and Layout

“Strategic objectives are the core of any strategy, and clearly defining these objectives is crucial for both formulating and implementing a strategy.” “They serve as an overarching framework that provides a broad, high-level perspective.” Therefore, research on China’s global energy strategy must begin with an examination of its strategic objectives.

Historically, the countries that have ranked first in energy consumption have all been hegemonic powers—for example, the Netherlands and Spain during the wood era, Britain during the coal era, and the United States during the oil era. Although China neither seeks nor intends to become a hegemon, its global energy strategy aims to leverage international energy cooperation to transform market power into national power within the context of international politics, thereby enhancing our voice in the global allocation of resources and institutional arrangements. This shift involves moving from simply pursuing energy strength to simultaneously pursuing both energy strength and energy power—transforming energy strength into energy power. This is the strategic goal of China’s global energy strategy. This goal is underpinned by a clear strategic framework consisting of four key components: “strategic mission,” “overall approach,” “strategic implementation,” and “strategic layout.” (See Table 4 for details.)

Table 4: China’s Global Energy Strategy Framework

The strategic mission of China’s global energy strategy is to promote energy cooperation and catalyze the energy revolution. As both a massive energy market with enormous potential and the world’s largest energy producer, China enjoys the advantage of being a “strategic buyer” and also possesses resource and technological advantages in certain types of energy. With its vast territory and numerous neighboring countries, China has multiple potential Eurasian strategic corridors, giving it clear transit advantages. By establishing mutually beneficial energy relationships, China can effectively advance its national political, security, and other strategic interests. On the other hand, at present, China’s share of clean energy use remains too low, energy efficiency is insufficient, environmental pollution is severe, and there is tremendous pressure to reduce emissions. Thus, the task of achieving clean environments and ecologically sustainable development is extremely challenging. Therefore, it is now imperative for China to expand imports of clean energy, introduce advanced energy-saving and environmentally friendly technologies, and develop alternative energy sources to replace oil and coal, thereby supporting the energy revolution.

To fulfill the strategic mission of China’s Global Energy Strategy, the overall guiding principle of the strategy is as follows: In line with the requirements of a new energy security outlook, we will implement the goals of the national energy strategy and the foreign policy strategy; safeguard national energy security and development, promote sustainable economic and social development, expand our country’s diplomatic space, and stabilize global energy security. We will strike a balance between the domestic and international markets, between traditional and non-traditional energy sources, between energy exploration and energy utilization, and between energy development and ecological security. We will comprehensively leverage various energy diplomacy resources, with the state taking the lead and multiple parties participating, vigorously developing all forms of international energy relations, fostering a favorable international environment for energy cooperation, and advancing the establishment of a new international energy order characterized by “reasonableness, harmony, win-win outcomes, and stability.”

The construction of a new international energy order that aligns with China’s national interests can only be achieved by providing regional and global public goods through energy diplomacy and energy services. International public goods are public goods that, in principle, can benefit populations in many countries across different regions—and indeed, the entire global population. For instance, energy security in countries around the world largely depends on the stability of the international energy market. Ensuring stable energy prices and safe energy transportation serves the interests of both energy-exporting and energy-importing countries alike. Thus, there arises an urgent need for international public goods in energy governance—public goods that must be provided urgently by certain energy-rich nations with substantial energy capabilities. By offering these international public goods in energy governance, China not only fulfills its commitment as a responsible major country but also transitions from being merely an energy giant to becoming an energy powerhouse.

The first priority in China’s global energy strategy should be the Central Asian countries and Russia along the Silk Road Economic Belt. Developing energy relations with these Central Asian countries and Russia is of great strategic significance for ensuring stability in China’s western and northern border regions, as well as for implementing the Western Development Strategy and the strategy to revitalize the old industrial bases in Northeast China. From an energy-economic perspective, the Central Asian countries and Russia possess abundant reserves of oil, natural gas, and uranium, making them promising potential energy-supply bases for China. Moreover, since China shares land borders with these countries, engaging in energy cooperation with them can not only reduce transportation costs but also mitigate security risks.

  Conclusion: Regional Implementation of China’s Global Energy Strategy—The Belt and Road Initiative

There are significant differences in energy resource endowments among the countries involved in the Belt and Road Initiative. These differences extend beyond traditional oil and gas resources to include such areas as competitive production capacity, new-energy technologies, energy financing, energy infrastructure development capabilities, and energy equipment. China boasts exceptionally strong energy capabilities in all these areas. Through energy investments and the construction of critical infrastructure—including power grids and oil-and-gas pipelines—China can enhance common energy security in the Belt and Road region, reduce regional energy poverty, and improve the quality of life for local populations. Moreover, through energy cooperation, China can transfer its existing competitive production capacity and energy equipment to countries along the Belt and Road, serving their energy needs. By engaging in energy diplomacy with resource-rich nations, importers, and transit countries along the Belt and Road, China is forging robust energy relationships. The interconnectedness fostered by energy infrastructure not only promotes shared prosperity in the region but also reflects China’s leveraging of its energy strengths. Based on the increasingly shared understanding of energy security—what we call the “new-energy security perspective”—among the 65 countries along the Belt and Road, China is pursuing common and sustainable energy security. This represents an international public good that China is providing to the Belt and Road region, laying a solid foundation for further cooperation between China and the countries along the route.

The “Belt and Road” region is what geopolitical scholar Mackinder referred to as the “Heartland”—a vast area encompassing Central Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and West Asia, which together form the “Silk Road Economic Belt.” At the same time, this region also corresponds to what Spengler termed the “Rimland”—comprising Southeast Asian nations that are part of the “Maritime Silk Road Economic Belt. Both regions represent expansive areas fiercely contested by maritime powers and land-based powers alike, serving as hybrid zones where land power and sea power intersect and collide. Thus, whoever controls the central region—the Heartland—and its surrounding Rimland will control the Eurasian continent; and whoever controls Eurasia will hold the destiny of the world in their hands. Although the prominent U.S. grand strategist Zbigniew Brzezinski considered Eurasia crucial to American national power, the United States has long neglected this region. Yet, according to Wallerstein’s World-Systems Theory—a key tenet of neo-Marxism—this very region consists of peripheral and semi-peripheral countries that supply core nations with resources, labor, and capital necessary for their development. It is precisely this region that the “Belt and Road” initiative seeks to cover and integrate.

Since the late 1990s, China’s energy companies have been making energy investments across the Eurasian continent. Today, Eurasia has developed an interconnected energy transportation network comprising oil and gas pipelines from Russia to Central and Eastern Europe, oil and gas pipelines between China and Russia, an oil pipeline between China and Kazakhstan, a natural gas pipeline between China and Central Asia, and an oil and gas pipeline between China and Myanmar. This network fully integrates the world’s two major energy-producing regions—the Middle East and the former Soviet states of Baku, the Caucasus, and Central Asia—with the Asia-Pacific demand center—currently experiencing the fastest growth in energy consumption—thus creating a regional energy market along the Belt and Road initiative that is both supply- and demand-driven and features a complete industrial chain. China’s energy investments in the Belt and Road region have re-emphasized the geopolitical significance and strategic importance of Eurasia, enabling China to translate its energy strength into energy power that is widely accepted by countries along the Belt and Road. As a result, China is increasingly emerging as a comprehensive maritime and land-based power.